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Abstract 
 
This thesis proposes a new approach to investigate insight problem solving. 
Introducing magic tricks as a problem solving task, we asked participants to find out the 
secret method used by the magician to create the magic effect. Based on the theoretical 
framework of the representational change theory, we argue that magic tricks are ideally suited 
to investigate insight because similar to established insight tasks like puzzles, observers’ prior 
knowledge activates constraints. In order to see through the magic trick, the constraints must 
be overcome by changing the problem representation. The aim of the present work is 
threefold: First, we set out to provide a proof of concept for this novel paradigm by 
demonstrating that it is actually possible for observers to gain insight into the magician’s 
secret method and that this can be experienced as a sudden, insightful solution. We therefore 
aimed at showing that magic tricks can trigger insightful solutions that are accompanied by an 
Aha! experience. The proposed paradigm could be a useful contribution to the field of insight 
research where new stimuli beyond traditional puzzle approaches are sorely needed. Second, 
the present work is aimed at contributing to a better understanding of the subjective Aha! 
experience that is currently often relied on as important classification criterion in 
neuroscientific studies of insight, yet remains conceptually vague. The new task will therefore 
be used to further elucidate the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by assessing 
participants’ individual solving experiences. As a third question, we investigated the influence 
of insight on memory. A positive impact of insight on subsequent solution recall is often 
implicitly assumed, because the representational change underlying insightful solutions is 
assumed to facilitate the retention of solution knowledge, yet this was never tested.  
A stimulus set of magic tricks was developed in collaboration with a professional 
magician, covering a large range of different magic effects and methods. After recording the 
tricks in a standardized theatre setting, pilot studies were run on 45 participants to identify 
appropriate tricks and to ensure that they were understandable, surprising and difficult. In the 
main experiment, 50 participants watched the final set of 34 magic tricks, with the task of 
trying to figure out how the trick was accomplished. Each trick was presented up to three 
times. Upon solving the trick, participants had to indicate whether they had found the solution 
through sudden insight (i.e. with an Aha! experience) or not. Furthermore, we obtained a 
detailed characterization of the Aha! experience by asking participants for a comprehensive 
quantitative (ratings on a visual analogue scale with fixed dimensions) and qualitative 
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evaluation (free self-reports) which was repeated after 14 days to control for its reliability. At 
that time, participants were also required to perform a recall of their solutions.  
We found that 49% of all magic tricks could be solved and specifically, that insightful 
solutions were elicited in 41.1% of solved trials. In comparison with noninsight solutions, 
insightful solutions (brought about by representational change) were more likely to be correct 
and reached earlier. Quantitative evaluations of individual Aha! experiences turned out to be 
highly reliable since they remained identical across the time span of 14 days. Qualitatively, 
participants reported more emotional than cognitive aspects. This primacy of positive 
emotions was found in qualitative as well as in quantitative evaluations, although two 
different methods were used. We also found that experiencing insight leads to a facilitated 
recall of the respective solutions since 64.4% of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, 
whereas only 52.4% of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly after a delay of 14 
days.  
We demonstrated the great potential of our new approach by providing a proof of 
concept for magic tricks as a problem solving task and conclude that magic tricks offer a 
novel way of inducing problem solving that elicits insight. The reliability of individual 
evaluations of Aha! experiences indicates that, despite its subjective character, it can be 
justified to use the Aha! experience as a classification criterion. The present work contributes 
to a better understanding of the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by providing evidence 
for the occurrence of strong positive emotions as a prevailing aspect. This work also revealed 
a memory advantage for solutions that were reached through insight, demonstrating a 
facilitating effect of previous insight experiences on the recall of solutions. This finding 
provides support for the assumption that a representational change underlying insightful 
solving experiences leads to long-lasting changes in the representation of a problem that 
facilitate the retention of the problem’s solution. In sum, the novel approach presented in this 
thesis is shown to constitute a valuable contribution to the field of insight research and offers 
much potential for future research. Revealing the relationship between insight and magic 
tricks, the framework of the representational change theory is applied to a new domain and 
thus enlarged. Combining the novel task domain of magic tricks with established insight tasks 
might help to further elucidate the process of insight problem solving which is a characteristic 
and vital part of human thinking and yet so difficult to grasp. 
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1.1 Outline of the Research Context 
1.1.1 Relevance 
The problem of insight remains one of the great mysteries of cognition. At the core of 
human intelligence, this paradoxical experience has so far withstood any attempts to fully 
reveal its inner workings. Understanding the exact mechanisms of insight is “one of the 
central questions of the psychology of thinking” (Mayer, 1995, p. 3) that generations of 
researchers have grappled with. Ohlsson ranks it among “the perennial problems of cognitive 
psychology” (Ohlsson, 1992, p. 1).  
Insight is a fundamental cognitive process that occurs in several different contexts, for 
example if a problem is suddenly solved, a situation is reinterpreted or a joke is explained 
(Kounios & Beeman, 2009, p. 210). 
Clearly, insight and creativity are closely related (e.g. Guilford, 1950, 1987). There 
exist several, mainly anecdotic accounts of great inventors’ illuminations (see Gruber, 1995, 
for a comprehensive, but also critical analysis of these historical sources). For example, at the 
“Benzolfest”, a ceremony held by the German Chemical Society in his honour on the 11th of 
March 1890, August Kekulé vividly described the sudden enlightenment that led him to 
discover the structure of the benzene ring:  
 
Ich drehte den Stuhl nach dem Kamin und versank in Halbschlaf. Wieder gaukelten 
die Atome vor meinen Augen. […] Alles in Bewegung, schlangenartig sich windend 
und drehend. Und siehe, was war das? Eine der Schlangen erfasste den eigenen 
Schwanz und höhnisch wirbelte das Gebilde vor meinen Augen. Wie durch einen 
Blitzstrahl erwachte ich; auch diesmal verbrachte ich den Rest der Nacht um die 
Consequenzen der Hypothese auszuarbeiten. (Schultz, 1890, p. 1306) 
 
 Translation by the author: “I turned my chair towards the fireplace and fell into a light 
slumber. Again, the atoms were gambolling before my eyes. […] All in motion, squirming 
and writhing like snakes. And lo! What did I see? One of the snakes caught its own tail and 
the structure whirled tauntingly before my eyes. I awoke as if struck by lightning; and again I 
spent the rest of the night to work out the consequences of the hypothesis.” 
This anecdote should not give the impression that such a stroke of genius does arise 
completely out of the blue. Quite often it is preceded by months or even years of careful 
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study. In a way, a prepared mind is needed for truly ingenious insights (as detailed, for 
example, by Ippolito & Tweney, 1995; or by Kounios et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, insights can result in important discoveries or innovations. Embedded in 
this larger perspective, insight can be regarded as an ubiquitous process which is highly 
relevant for the scientific, technological or cultural advancement of a society. Unfortunately, a 
typical characteristic of insight is that it cannot be forced. Currently, the circumstances that 
give raise to insightful moments are largely unknown, but in the long run, it might be possible 
to identify facilitating conditions (e.g. Dow & Mayer, 2004). Therefore, the field of insight 
research may provide us with new methods to foster innovation - an invaluable asset in a 
world that becomes increasingly complex and poses new challenges every day.  
 
1.1.2 Scope and Definition  
Only few studies deal with insight in contexts such as scientific discoveries (Dunbar, 
1995), identifying a blurry object (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990) or grasping 
the meaning of metaphors and jokes (Ritchie, 2004). Typically, it is investigated in the 
context of human problem solving. In this thesis, we focus on insight in the problem solving 
domain, following Mayer’s definition: “The term insight has been used to name the process 
by which a problem solver suddenly moves from a state of not knowing how to solve a 
problem to a state of knowing how to solve it” (Mayer, 1995, p. 3). This operational definition 
regards insight as a transition event that can be measured empirically. Insight as a moment of 
sudden knowledge of the solution is thought to follow from restructuring processes (Duncker, 
1945; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ohlsson, 1984a), to be discussed in detail in 1.2.1 and 1.3. 
Furthermore, insight is often reported to be accompanied by a strong response, the Aha! 
experience (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Gick & Lockhart, 1995). This is often taken as the 
discriminative criterion to set it apart from analytic and gradual problem solving (Metcalfe, 
1986; Evans, 2008).  
The terms insight, Aha! experience and restructuring are used rather inconsistently in 
the literature, sometimes synonymously. We need to clarify that for the present purpose, we 
use the term restructuring according to Ohlsson’s definition as “a change in the problem 
solver’s mental representation of the problem” (Ohlsson, 1984b, p. 119), to be detailed in 1.3. 
Insight therefore results from restructuring of the problem representation and refers to the 
sudden comprehension of the solution of a problem. It will be used as the more general term. 
We specify Aha! as the phenomenological experience that accompanies insight. 
Behaviourally, it is the best observable aspect of insight and we will therefore use the Aha! 
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experience as an indicator that insight has occurred (this decision will later be justified and 
discussed in detail, see 1.5.1).  
Scientific interest in problem solving is far from new. Since the end of the 19th 
century, the question how humans solve difficult problems has been a classical research topic 
in psychology. The next chapter describes the historic development of the field of insight 
research which was influenced by three main theories: Associationism, Gestalt psychology 
and information processing accounts (Funke, 2003).  
 
 
1.2 Historical Background 
1.2.1 The Foundations of Insight Research  
The dawn of insight research dates back to the 1920s of the last century, to the time 
when the Gestalt Psychologists (Köhler, 1921; Wertheimer, 1925, 1959; Duncker, 1926, 
1935; Koffka, 1935) set out to empirically investigate human and animal problem solving 
behaviour. In one of his chimpanzee experiments, Wolfgang Köhler confronted the animal 
with the task of reaching a banana that was hung high up on the ceiling of the cage, with 
several boxes scattered on the floor (Köhler, 1921). After several fruitless (sic!) jumping 
attempts, the chimpanzee turned away and sat motionless for a while. Then, suddenly, he 
reached for the boxes, stacked them on top of each other, climbed on the stack and got hold of 
the banana (see figure 1). According to Köhler, this action sequence could not be explained 
by a simple stimulus-response association as suggested by behaviourists (e.g. Watson, 1913), 
because it was not part of the ape’s general repertoire of behaviour (prior experience) nor was 
it produced by trial and error. Instead, he suggested that the animal acted insightfully. As a 
possible limitation, it must be mentioned that the chimpanzee was not able to reproduce this 
behaviour during the next trial. Only after Köhler had built the stack for him four times 
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Figure 1. Problem solving in animals. After unsuccessfully trying to reach the banana by jumping, a chimpanzee 
manages to reach the fruit by stacking boxes on top of each other and climbing on them. (Picture taken from 
Köhler, 1921, p. 97)  
 
 
This approach constituted an attack on the theory of associationism that was 
predominant at the time. Under the assumption that the mind consists of ideas and of 
associations between these ideas that are established through prior experience, thinking was 
described as following a chain of associations from one idea to the next (Mandler & Mandler, 
1964; Mayer, 1995). Therefore, associationists (e.g. Thorndike who worked with cats) 
regarded a given problem solving task as a stimulus with which several possible responses are 
associated, with the strongest association being automatically chosen. This view reduces 
problem solving to either the mere reproduction of previously learnt behaviour or to blindly 
trying out new stimulus-response combinations by trial and error that can lead to accidental 
success (Thorndike, 1898). In contrast, the Gestalt school of thought regarded problem 
solving as an active process of productive thinking (Wertheimer, 1959), as opposed to simple 
reproductive thinking. Productive thinking means that the problem solver reorganizes his 
perception of the problem through structural changes. Karl Duncker, a disciple of Köhler and 
Wertheimer, focused on the conditions requiring such structural changes and stressed that, in 
contrast to the associationists’ assumptions, prior experience is not necessarily helpful, but 
can even be a hindrance by leading to a fixation on certain problem aspects (functional 
fixedness, or “funktionale Gebundenheit”, Duncker, 1935). In this case, the mental 
representation of the problem must be changed in order to reach a solution.  
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The Gestalt psychologists postulated that such structural changes always lead to an 
improvement, described as a driving force from a defective Gestalt (i.e. a problem), assumed 
to cause strain and tension for the thinker, towards a “good Gestalt” (Wertheimer, 1959, p. 
239). For example, Wertheimer explains “der Begriff, den ich von einer Sache habe, wird in 
solchem Prozesse oft nicht nur bereichert, sondern verändert, verbessert, vertieft” 
(Wertheimer, 1925, p. 175), which can be translated to “in such a process, my conceptual 
understanding of the matter at hand is not only enriched, but transformed, improved, 
elaborated”. For this hypothetical transformation process, he coined the term restructuring (in 
German “Umstrukturierung”, Duncker, 1935, p. 34; or even “Umkrempelung” and 
“Einschnappen”, Wertheimer, 1925, p. 173 and 174). Although, especially in the beginning, 
the Gestalt psychologists put emphasis on visual perception processes (e.g. Wertheimer’s 
parallelogram from 1925), they turned their attention to problem solving in general and 
applied their ideas to a wide range of practical, mathematical and scientific problems. A 
classical one of them will now serve to illustrate the meaning of restructuring.  
In the Candle Problem (Duncker, 1935), participants are asked to attach a candle to a 
door so that it can burn properly. Among the available objects are a box of matches and a box 


















Figure 2. The Candle Problem (Duncker, 1935). Problem: You have a candle, some matches, and a box of tacks. 
Support the candle on the wall. Solution: Empty the tackbox. Tack the box to the wall. Set the candle on the 
platform formed by the box. (Picture and text taken from Isaak & Just, 1995, p. 313) 
 
 
According to Duncker, prior knowledge restricts the function of the boxes to a 
container (functional fixedness, Duncker, 1945), here a container for tacks. The solution is to 
restructure the problem situation by changing the function of the box: to empty it, attach it to 
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the door with a few tacks and use it as a small shelf to place the candle on. The previous 
function of the box as “container” must be changed to the new function “platform”. 
Restructuring is the process that drives this change. Eventually, an insightful solution is 
reached. 
In his investigations on mental set (1942), Luchins, another disciple of Max 
Wertheimer, transferred the concept of functional fixedness (mainly used with regard to the 
function of objects by Duncker, 1935, 1945) to problem solvers’ fixation on one, previously 
successfully applied solution method. The repeated application of this method leads to a 
fixation so that for subsequent problems, alternative solution methods are not considered 
anymore even if they now were more appropriate.  
The concepts of restructuring and insight were taken up by other researchers, for 
example, Donald Hebb, commonly more known for his work on cell assemblies and learning, 
proposed a basic model for restructuring on the neuronal level (Hebb, 1949). In 1.3 we will 
present a modern theoretical framework for these concepts that was suggested by Ohlsson 
(1992). 
Of course, from a contemporary point of view (nearly 100 years later!), the Gestalt 
school of thought must be criticized with regard to several points. Methodologically, the 
experiments remained largely descriptive and lack the experimental precision required today 
(e.g. control conditions). Theoretically, the concepts of insight and restructuring remained 
underspecified, so that no testable hypotheses could be derived. However, we should credit 
these early experimental psychologists for the audacity and creativity with which they set out 
to investigate problem solving. For a very detailed account and a critical acclaim of the 
Gestalt psychologists’ work, please refer to Ohlsson (1984a). It should also be noted that there 
has been a fundamental debate about the validity and usefulness of the Gestalt concept of 
insight as a special process (specifically, Weisberg & Alba, 1981; and the reply by 
Dominowski, 1981), but this is beyond the scope of the present work and will not be 
considered further. To conclude, we agree with Michael Eysenck: “The Gestalt work is not a 
Jurassic creature to be buried in the cemetery of psychological theory” (Eysenck & Keane, 
2000, p. 399). 
 
1.2.2 The Information Processing Account 
In the late 1950s and 1960s, influenced by the cognitive revolution, thinking came to 
be regarded as processing of information. In information processing terms, a problem is 
defined as a discrepancy between the present situation and the goal situation (Betsch, Funke, 
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& Plessner, 2011) while the operators how to get from one to the other are unknown. With 
their problem space theory, Newell and Simon (1972) introduced a comprehensive theory of 
problem solving that is still very influential today. Human problem solving is regarded as a 
search in a problem space which contains all possible states of a problem, amongst them the 
initial state and the goal state. Moreover, there exists a set of operators that allow 
transformations from one state into another. The problem space can be visualized in so-called 
state graphs. In this context, Dunbar differentiates two main types of problems (Dunbar, 
1998): While in ill-defined problems, e.g. stopping climate change, the initial and goal states 
as well as the possible operators that can be applied may be incomplete or unknown, well-
defined problems like a mathematical equation have clearly defined states and operators. A 
classical example is the Tower of Hanoi that was invented in 1883 by the French 
mathematician Édouard Lucas as a solitaire game. Today widely used as a 
neuropsychological testing tool, this puzzle consists of a wooden game board with three disks 
of different diameters placed on three pegs. The task is to rearrange the disks from their initial 
position to match a specified goal position while obeying certain rules (compare Faber, 2008). 
The Tower of Hanoi state graph (figure 3) comprises 27 possible states which can be reached 
from any neighbouring state by one movement. The problem solver is asked to find the 
shortest path between two given states (start and goal state). Thanks to the accessibility and 
clarity of its state graph (see below), the Tower of Hanoi represents an ideal paradigm to 
investigate problem solving strategies in the framework of the problem space theory (e.g. 
Simon, 1975; Anzai & Simon, 1979; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). For example, the 
general problem solver, a computer program developed by Newell and Simon (Newell, Shaw, 
& Simon, 1959), was able to solve Tower of Hanoi problems due to this high formality.  
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Figure 3. Tower of Hanoi problem space. A spatial distribution of all possible states of the Tower of Hanoi 




 According to Dunbar (1998), different analytic strategies can be employed: When 
using heuristics, problem solvers are searching for the goal state with a rule of thumb that will 
lead to a correct pathway in most cases, but not in all. In contrast, algorithms give guaranteed 
solutions, but only for certain problems. A very systematic strategy is the hill climbing 
technique, in which the problem solver looks one move ahead and moves to a position that 
resembles the goal state the most (Greeno, 1974). Following this rule may be deceptive if a 
move seems to lead the subject closer to the goal but in fact takes him further away. In those 
situations, the appropriate strategy to employ is a means-end-analysis. This requires the 
problem solver to calculate the difference between the initial state and the goal state. If the 
latter cannot be achieved immediately, the problem must be further decomposed into one or 
more subgoals which must be solved on the way until the final state may be reached (Simon, 
1975; Goel & Grafman, 1995).  
At first glance, it seems impossible to integrate the concept of insight into the 
information-processing account. Yet there have been several fruitful attempts to explain 
insight within this framework (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 
2001;  and, the most relevant one for the present work, Ohlsson, 1984b; Knoblich, Ohlsson, 
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). Ohlsson and Knoblich’s approach will be presented in detail in 
section 1.3. However, instead of the variegated types of problems used by the Gestalt 
psychologists (most of them ill-defined, with a very large problem space), problem solving 
research in the 60s and 70s focused on well-defined tasks like the Tower of Hanoi. For 
example, the general problem solver (Newell et al., 1959) is restricted to these types of 
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formalized tasks. Consequentially, insight research dropped out of the focus of mainstream 
psychology, as pointed out by Michael Wertheimer (Wertheimer, 1985), the son of Max 
Wertheimer. 
However, after this period of relative quietness, the field of insight research has now 
received renewed scientific interest that was reflected in Sternberg and Davidson’s seminal 
book The Nature of Insight (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). Despite more than a century of 
research dedicated to it, the true nature of the insight mechanism still remains elusive. But this 
fascinating phenomenon has taken hold of researchers again. Since Köhler and Wertheimer’s 
first writings, considerable progress has been made. Most importantly, theoretical accounts 
have been developed that allow systematic inference and testing of different hypotheses and 
thus make up for the lack of theory inherent in the Gestalt school of thought. We will now 
outline the main theoretical advances and some empirical results from recent insight research 
that form the basic framework for the present thesis. 
 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework:                                                            
The Representational Change Theory 
Adopting the central concept of the Gestalt theory of thinking, Ohlsson (1984b) also 
based his theoretical account on restructuring (see 1.1.2 for the definition). As the more 
general term for changes in the mental representation of a problem, he uses the expression 
representational change. By proposing the representational change theory, he was able to 
reconcile the two seemingly incompatible approaches to human problem solving just 
presented: On the one hand, the Gestalt concept of insight, the sudden appearance of a 
solution, leaving problem solvers unable to report any conscious solution strategies, and on 
the other hand, the information-processing view of problem solving as a consciously 
controlled, step-wise search process through a space of alternatives (Newell & Simon, 1972). 
Here, a short outline of the theory will be given (based on Ohlsson, 1984a, 1984b, 1992; and 
Knoblich et al., 1999).  
In the representational change theory, past experience is assumed to be a key factor in 
problem solving. Obviously, in many situations it is helpful and efficient to rely on prior 
knowledge because complexity is reduced - for example, always opening bottles of wine with 
a corkscrew. However, sometimes problem solvers’ prior knowledge (expressed in 
assumptions how to solve the problem at hand) is wrong or inappropriate for a given situation, 
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for example if the corkscrew is missing. In this case, the previously useful assumptions 
(“bottles are to be opened with a corkscrew”) turn into constraints that are hindering to act 
successfully. More specifically, following the Gestalt tradition, the representational change 
theory assumes that prior knowledge and inappropriate assumptions lead to an incorrect 
representation of the problem and thus prevent a solution (e.g. pushing the cork into the 
bottle). An impasse is thought to occur after repeated failure. 
Ohlsson introduces a new conceptualization of insight by emphasizing the impasse as 
a precondition for insight to occur (impasse – insight – sequence). An impasse denotes “a 
mental state in which problem-solving has come to a halt; all possibilities seem to have been 
exhausted and the problem-solver cannot think of any way to proceed” (Ohlsson, 1992, p. 4). 
Consequently, if problem solving proceeds smoothly from a question to the answer, for 
example, if a lengthy multiplication problem is solved, the solution would not be regarded as 
insightful. On the other hand, if prior knowledge imposes an over-constrained, biased mental 
representation of the problem, the problem solver gets stuck in an impasse with the 
impression that the task is unsolvable. Problem solving attempts cease. Through restructuring, 
the impasse can be broken and an insightful solution can be reached.  
Ohlsson postulates as the function of restructuring “to change the set of applicable 
operators” (1984b, p. 120). Restructuring means that certain encodings are changed, and 
consequently, the mental representation of a problem is changed, too. Turning back to our 
previous example of the Candle Problem, the encoding of the box as a container would be an 
inappropriate assumption that must be overcome in order to solve the problem. Relaxing the 
initially over-constrained problem representation, the problem can be solved by using a 
container as a platform.  
Ohlsson (1992) suggested such a relaxation of constraints as one possible mechanism 
by which restructuring might be accomplished. Constraint relaxation is thought to be 
necessary if there exist certain self-imposed constraints that unnecessarily prevent a solution 
(for example, assumptions about rules that do not apply and that were never explicitly stated). 
To reach a break-through, these constraints need to be relaxed. Other mechanisms that could 
be recruited in order to change mental problem representations (e.g. elaboration, re-encoding) 
were also postulated by Ohlsson, but these will not be discussed here. 
Knoblich and colleagues (1999) took up Ohlsson’s suggestions by showing how the 
constraint relaxation hypothesis could be used to predict individual problem difficulty in the 
domain of matchstick arithmetic problems, compare 1.4. 
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To further illustrate the idea of constraint relaxation, consider the following example 
(Inverted Pyramid Problem, Ohlsson, 1992): “A giant inverted steel pyramid is perfectly 
balanced on its point. Any movement of the pyramid will cause it to topple over. Underneath 
the pyramid is a $100 bill. How would you remove the bill without disturbing the pyramid?“ 
(Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993, p. 183).  
The difficulty of this insight problem lies in the implicit constraint that the dollar bill 
must not be damaged. This prior knowledge element of the mental representation of the task 
acts as a constraint on the set of applicable actions. Only if this constraint is relaxed, can a 
solution be found: Putting a match to the dollar bill and burning it.   
 But we must also consider two cases in which restructuring is not possible at all 
(Ohlsson, 1984b): First, if the correct encoding is already activated, no restructuring is needed 
(for example, if the problem solver was just primed to think of platforms). Second, 
restructuring cannot occur if the correct encoding is not available to the problem solver (for 
example, if he had never encountered the concept of a platform). Later on (section 6.4), we 
will discuss these two cases applied to the paradigm used in the present work.  
 Ohlssons’ representational change theory has become very influential in recent insight 
research (e.g. Haider & Rose, 2007; Luo & Knoblich, 2007; Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 
2008) and its assumptions are now part of current definitions of insight, for example, “The 
term ‘insight’ is used to designate the clear and sudden understanding of how to solve a 
problem. Insight is thought to arise when a solver breaks free of unwarranted assumptions, or 
forms novel, task-related connections between existing concepts or skills” (Bowden, Jung-
Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005, p. 322). In the following, we will present several studies 
that provide empirical evidence for this theory. 
 
 
1.4 Empirical Findings 
The literature on insight is extensive, besides Sternberg’s comprehensive book 
(Sternberg & Davidson, 1995), a review by Chu and MacGregor (2011) provides an overview 
on more recent developments. The following studies were selected because they represent 
important findings with regard to the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
 Knoblich and colleagues (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001) tested specific 
predictions derived from the representational change theory in an eye-movement study on 
matchstick arithmetic tasks. In this task, Roman numerals are constructed out of matchsticks 
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and participants are asked to transform an incorrect arithmetic statement into a correct one by 
moving only a limited number of matchsticks (Knoblich et al., 1999). In their study, they 
could not only replicate previous behavioural findings (Knoblich et al., 1999), but also found 
matching eye-movement data. They demonstrated that, shortly before the solution occurred, 
successful solvers allocated their attention to those elements of the problem that previously 
had been neglected due to self-imposed constraints (compare Grant & Spivey, 2003). In this 
case, prior arithmetic knowledge had imposed the constraint that only the numerals in an 
equation could be manipulated, but not the operators (-/+/=). If this constraint was relaxed, 
attention was turned towards the operators and the problem could quickly get solved. This can 
be regarded as indirect evidence for constraint relaxation. In the same study, Knoblich et al. 
(2001) further demonstrated that for successful solvers, the number of long fixation times 
increases throughout the problem solving process. The longest fixation times were found in 
the last time interval before the solution, i.e. shortly before insight occurred, there was a phase 
without systematic eye-movement patterns. This was interpreted as physiological evidence for 
the impasse – insight sequence postulated by the representational change theory. The basic 
idea was that in such an “idling” phase more appropriate representations could be established 
that yield a new insight. 
 Additional behavioural evidence for constraint relaxation was provided by Knoblich et 
al. (1999) who found that the degree of necessary constraint relaxation was mirrored in the 
differential difficulty of individual problems. That is, problems that required multiple 
constraints to be relaxed were more difficult than those for which only one constraint had to 
be overcome. This finding was later replicated (Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2006).  
 These matchstick arithmetic studies empirically support the conception of 
restructuring through constraint relaxation. Of course, studies from other task domains are 
needed to strengthen this claim (see Jones, 2003; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004).  
 Durso et al. (Durso, Rea, & Dayton, 1994) conducted a pioneering study in which they 
tried to directly assess restructuring by collecting information from participants about their 
task representation. To do so, they asked participants to repeatedly rate the key words of the 
task (a verbal riddle) with regard to their similarity. Based on these ratings, a so-called 
Pathfinder Scaling Algorithm was used to model problem solvers’ latent mental 
representations of the task. Comparing successful and unsuccessful solvers, they could show 
that the initial representations of both groups were rather similar and centred around wrong, 
inappropriate concepts (i.e. constraints in Ohlsson’s terminology) – but that shortly before 
they came up with the correct solution, successful solvers’ representations had changed to 
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focusing on the relevant aspects of the task. This is a first attempt to actually model the 
underlying problem representations (see also Hélie & Sun, 2010; Thagard & Stewart, 2011). 
 Based on these encouraging findings, we decided to develop a novel problem solving 
task that builds on the theoretical framework of the representational change theory. In section 
1.6, this new approach is presented. 
 
 
1.5 Methodological Issues 
From an experimental psychologist’s viewpoint, the investigation of insight poses 
methodological challenges. How can this enigmatic process be investigated under laboratory 
conditions and how can any insight experiment fulfil the requirements of a rigorously 
controlled empirical study? 
 
An insight is so capricious, such a slippery thing to catch in flagrante, that it appears 
almost deliberately designed to defy empirical inquiry. To most neuroscientists, the 
prospect of looking for creativity in the brain must seem like trying to nail jelly to the 
wall. (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p. 822) 
 
 Reading this statement, the following question arises: Perhaps the main hindrance is 
not the jelly-like substance, but the usage of the nails - which simply are not appropriate for 
this task? Consequently, another method must be found to solve the problem. For example, a 
possible solution could be to reduce the room temperature to freeze the jelly and then pin it on 
the wall with glue.  
Similarly, insight researchers are on the constant lookout for appropriate tasks and 
paradigms to tackle their topic. MacGregor and Cunningham have recently pointed out the 
“relative dearth of problems” (2008, p. 263). In this thesis, we will therefore suggest a novel 
paradigm. Before that, we will discuss two of the main methodological difficulties in 
investigating insight problem solving.  
 
1.5.1 Has Insight Occurred? 
Obviously, the insight phenomenon itself is very hard to grasp. There is no clear 
behavioural marker indicating that insight has taken place. Even if a problem is solved, it is 
not discernible if restructuring or more analytical processes (e.g. hill-climbing, as postulated 
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by the problem space theory) were involved. In general, researchers have taken different 
approaches to handle this difficulty, each emphasizing different aspects for defining insight 
(Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009). Researchers focussing on a task dimension (as detailed by 
Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009) argue that there exist problems which always require 
restructuring for a solution due to their inherent structure (compare also next section). If such 
“insight problems” are solved, it is commonly assumed that restructuring has taken place (e.g. 
Chronicle, MacGregor and Ormerod, 2004). This approach is problematic because the 
definition of insight becomes circular, as Öllinger and Knoblich point out (Öllinger & 
Knoblich, 2009, p. 3): „Insight problems are problems that require insight, and insight occurs 
when insight problems are solved“, see also Dominowski and Dallob (1995).  
Fleck et al. (2004; 2008) have taken another route by recording thinking-aloud-
protocols and trying to infer from them if restructuring was involved. More recently, 
researchers interested in detecting possible neural correlates of insight have begun to rely on 
the phenomenological feature of insight, the Aha! experience (Bowden et al., 2005; 
Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008). The Aha! experience is generally described as very 
pleasant, connected with emotional arousal and with a strong certainty that the solution is 
correct (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). This phenomenological approach (compare Öllinger & 
Knoblich, 2009) uses subjective reports of Aha! experiences to differentiate insightful (“with 
Aha!”) from noninsightful (“without Aha!”) solving events.  
At present, we think that the latter approach to determine the occurrence of insight is 
the most reasonable one. We agree with Bowden and colleagues (2005) who argue that any 
problem can be solved either with or without restructuring (i.e. with or without insight), 
depending on whether an over-constrained problem representation was imposed through prior 
knowledge or not. For example, as already discussed in 1.3, in Duncker’s Candle Problem 
(1935), if someone has previously used a box as a platform, no constraint exists and therefore 
the solution is obvious and can be reached without the impasse – insight sequence postulated 
by Ohlsson (1992). In other words, “the presence or absence of insight resides in the solver’s 
solution rather than in the problem” (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007, p. 88). Consequently, 
one has to control for the occurrence of insight by directly asking the problem solvers about 
it. In agreement with Bowden et al. (2007), we regard the Aha! experience as the best 
observable aspect of insight. Therefore, in the current work, we provided our participants with 
clear descriptions of insightful (“with Aha!”) and noninsightful (“without Aha!”) solution 
experiences and asked them to sort their solutions on a trial-by-trial basis into these two 
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categories. Adopting Bowden’s approach (2007), we assume that these reports are reliable 
markers of restructuring and insight. For this purpose, the following instruction was used:  
 
We would like to know whether you experienced a feeling of insight when you solved a 
magic trick. A feeling of insight is a kind of “Aha!” characterized by suddenness and 
obviousness. Like an enlightenment. You are relatively confident that your solution is 
correct without having to check it. In contrast, you experienced no Aha! if the solution 
occurs to you slowly and stepwise, and if you need to check it by watching the clip 
once more. As an example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on all at once in 
contrast to slowly dimming it up. We ask for your subjective rating whether it felt like 
an Aha! experience or not, there is no right or wrong answer. Just follow your 
intuition. (Adapted from Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) 
 
 Of course, such a “phenomenological” approach to assessing the occurrence of insight 
also entails serious drawbacks: First, it heavily depends on the subjective judgement of 
participants (and this burdens participants with a second task that might have an impact on 
their problem solving performance). Second, the close relationship between the Aha! 
experience and insight is merely an assumption that is plausible, but has not been tested 
empirically so far. Third, in comparison to the widely used problem-based approach (e.g. 
Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004), it reduces the number of valid “insight” trials in 
any study, because the problem solver categorizes many trials as not insightful.  
 
1.5.2 Which Tasks to Use? 
There is an ongoing debate about whether such a thing as an “insight problem” (that 
can only be solved through insightful processes) truly exists. Many studies compare a 
previously fixed set of “insight tasks” with a set of “noninsight tasks”. For example, Gilhooly 
and Murphy (2005) classified a large set of problems using a cluster analysis and later based 
their comparisons on these two sets (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). We decided to take another 
approach. In the context of the representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et 
al., 1999), the present work is based on the following rationale:  
Any problem can be solved with or without insight (see above). Consequently, 
“insight problems” per se do not exist. However, there are tasks that seem especially suited to 
trigger insightful solutions, namely those that “have a high probability of triggering an initial 
representation which has a low probability of activating the knowledge needed to solve the 
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problem” (Ohlsson, 1992, p.10). We therefore asked participants trial-wise to report on the 
occurrence of insight, and at the same time, we implemented a special task domain which 
meets Ohlsson’s criterion: Magic tricks. They seem to be perfectly suited because in general, 
magic tricks only work because the observer is misled into generating a wrong representation 
of the problem. In contrast to many insight problems, magic tricks have already been “tested” 
for centuries and only those that reliably trigger biased representations have survived until 
today. We therefore predict that magic tricks will often be solved with insight. 
In terms of problem solving theory (as presented in section 1.2.2), we categorize 
magic tricks as ill-defined problems because there is no clearly definable problem space. Of 
course, the goal state and the start state are quite clear (even if some aspects of the problem 
might be deliberately hidden from the spectator). However, the operators that can be applied 
to get from one state to the other are not only unknown, because the full set of magic methods 
has for centuries been kept secret by the magicians’ society with its convention to observe 
secrecy, but also theoretically unlimited. 
 
 
1.6 A New Approach to Investigate Insight  
This thesis proposes a new approach for the investigation of the insight phenomenon. 
Magic tricks are introduced as a problem solving task: The problem solver is asked to find out 
the secret method used by the magician to accomplish the trick. Already in the 19th century, 
experimental psychologists have tried to link psychology to the ancient art of conjuring 
(Jastrow, 1888). More recently, it has been suggested by Kuhn et al. that magic techniques 
could be adopted as research tools for cognitive science (Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008). 
First pioneering studies have already been published in the field of visual attention in which 
special magic tricks were deployed as stimuli (e.g. Kuhn & Tatler, 2005; Kuhn, Tatler, 
Findlay, & Cole, 2008; Kuhn, Kourkoulou, & Leekam, 2010; Cavina-Pratesi, Kuhn, 
Ietswaart, & Milner, 2011). For example, Kuhn and Land (2006) presented their participants 
with a magic trick in which a ball seems to vanish in mid-air. The ball is repeatedly thrown up 
in the air by the magician and then caught again. After two real throws, a fake throw is 
performed while the ball is secretly concealed in the magician’s hand. Interestingly, 63% of 
the observers reported to have seen the ball leave the hand, move up in the air and disappear - 
even though it was no longer physically present, but covered by the magician’s palm. This 
illusory percept seems to be based on social cues like the magician’s head direction and eye 
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gaze (both implying that the ball actually moved up during the fake throw). Recently, the first 
neuroimaging study on magic tricks was conducted by Parris and colleagues (Parris, Kuhn, 
Mizon, Benattayallah, & Hodgson, 2009) who could show that the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex are involved in the perception of magic tricks. As 
impressively demonstrated in these studies, magic tricks can be used to learn more about 
human visual perception and attention (see Kuhn, Amlani, et al., 2008, for a thorough 
discussion). 
However, in the present work, we have developed yet a different approach by 
proposing to use magic tricks to investigate human problem solving. We will now shortly 
outline our rationale why magic tricks are ideally suited as an insight paradigm (to be further 
elaborated in section 2.2.1). Comparable to classical insight problems (Weisberg, 1995), 
magic tricks take advantage of the fact that self-imposed constraints are activated by prior 
knowledge (Ohlsson, 1992; Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009). Deliberately, magicians exploit 
spectators’ implicit assumptions as part of their methods (e.g. if a bottle is held with two 
hands, it must be a heavy, solid object). The magician benefits from the fact that these 
constraints are activated highly automatically and that it is very hard to overcome them 
(Tamariz, 1988). An over-constrained mental representation of the problem (in this case, 
finding a plausible explanation for the magic effect) is the consequence. We therefore assume 
that this paradigm can actually elicit representational difficulties (compare Ash, Cushen, & 
Wiley, 2009). The only possibility to overcome these difficulties and “solve” the magic trick 
is to relax the constraints, as suggested by Ohlsson and Knoblich et al. (Ohlsson, 1992; 
Knoblich et al., 1999). Of course, as already discussed, it is also possible to reach a solution 
without any restructuring, but in a smooth and continuous way. This would be the case if a 
person’s prior knowledge does not lead to any constraints (due to a different knowledge base, 
or due to previous experience with magic or perhaps simply because of a recent activation of 
appropriate concepts) and therefore, their mental representation is not constrained and already 
includes the solution. Based on these considerations, we asked participants to differentiate 
Aha! trials from trials in which no restructuring was necessary (see above). 
 To develop a suitable set of magic stimuli for our research question, we collaborated 
with Thomas Fraps, a professional magician. 40 magic tricks that seemed feasible for a filmed 
performance were preselected according to sensory (only visual effects in a silent 
performance) as well as cognitive (relatively simple, short tricks with only one magic effect) 
requirements. These tricks were then performed and recorded in a standardized stage setting 
with a digital video camera. The resulting video clips of magic tricks were extensively tested 
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in three pilot studies on a sample of 45 students who were asked to rate the clips through a 
questionnaire with regard to parameters such as cleverness, astonishment and 
comprehensibility. Taking into account these results, half of the video clips were improved 
and re-recorded in a second recording session. The final stimulus set consisted of 34 magic 
tricks that covered a wide range of different effects (e.g. transposition, restoration, vanish) 
and methods (e.g. misdirection, gimmicks, optical illusions). They are listed in detail in 
appendix A. 
We claim that with these kinds of stimuli, we can approach real-world problem 
solving, in contrast to strictly controlled paper-and-pencil tasks (e.g. the nine-dot problem or 
the Tower of Hanoi) that are artificially construed. In this respect, we follow the Gestalt 
tradition whose researchers didn’t shy away from using hands-on problems, in which 
participants tacked boxes to the wall, burned candles and swung ropes to try out their solution 
ideas (e.g. Duncker, 1926; or Maier, 1930). We suggest a shift of paradigm, away from 
artificial problems towards more naturalistic problems. In our opinion, the field of problem 
solving research could profit greatly from a new type of tasks: Problems that people are 
genuinely interested in, problems that vex them, problems that they are intrinsically motivated 
to solve – and not only because the experimenter told them to work it out. 
 
  
1.7 Research Questions and Aims of Thesis 
With regard to the mechanisms of insight, many questions remain. In the present 
thesis, we focused on three research questions (see below). Each of these is covered in one 
chapter (2, 3, and 4), with each chapter structured like an individual manuscript. Note that we 
conducted one large study that comprised three different tasks which yielded all the data 
presented here:  
 
1. Problem solving of magic tricks 
2. Qualitative and quantitative assessment of Aha! experience 
3. Recall of solutions after 14 days delay 
  
 To avoid redundancy, we included a general method section in the first manuscript 
(chapter 2) with shared method parts (participants, stimuli and main procedure), and described 
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other method elements that are relevant for only one research question directly in the method 
section of the respective chapter. The three research questions are now presented. 
 
1.7.1 Working Wonders? Investigating Insight with Magic Tricks 
First, answering the need for new stimuli, we aimed at introducing magic tricks as a 
new paradigm for insight research. After selecting and recording a set of magic tricks, 
extensive piloting was necessary to improve the trick videos and to establish that they could 
actually be solved (feasibility of the task). Our goal was to provide a proof of concept for the 
new paradigm by demonstrating that insightful solutions are reliably triggered.  
 
1.7.2 It's a Kind of Magic - New Insights into the Nature of Aha! 
 Second, we aimed at contributing to a better understanding of the subjective Aha! 
experience that is currently often relied on as important classification criterion in 
neuroscientific studies of insight, yet remains conceptually vague. Different dimensions of the 
Aha! experience such as suddenness (Metcalfe, 1986), happiness (Gick & Lockhart, 1995) or 
impasse (Ohlsson, 1992) have been postulated. Therefore, assuming a multidimensional 
construct where the interplay of different components establishes the Aha! experience, we 
assessed the relative importance of the involved components by obtaining both qualitative and 
quantitative Aha! ratings from participants, individually for each dimension.  
 
1.7.3 Facilitated Recall of Insight Solutions 
 Third, we investigated the impact of insightful solution experiences on memory 
performance. This impact is often implicitly assumed, yet was never systematically tested in a 
comparable design. We aimed at providing empirical support for Knoblich et al.’s (1999) 
transfer hypothesis that the restructuring process underlying insightful experiences leads to 
persisting changes in the representation of a problem (transfer hypothesis). Specifically, we 
hypothesized that insight solutions (with Aha! experience) would be remembered better than 
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2.1 Abstract 
 Introducing magic tricks as an insight problem solving task, we propose a new 
approach to investigate restructuring, the key mechanism that yields sudden insight into the 
solution of a problem. We argue that magic tricks are ideally suited because in order to gain 
insight into the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints 
through restructuring. Exposing 50 participants to 34 different magic tricks, the utility of this 
paradigm is tested. Each trick was repeated up to three times and participants were asked to 
find out how the trick was accomplished. Upon solving a trick, participants indicated if they 
had reached the solution either through sudden insight (accompanied by an Aha! experience) 
or analytically (without Aha! experience). Insight was reported in 41.1% of solutions. In 
comparison with noninsight solutions, insight solutions were more likely to be true and were 
reached earlier. Overall, 49% of trials were solved showing that this paradigm is feasible. 
Providing a proof of concept, this study demonstrates the great potential of using magic tricks 
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2.2 Introduction 
Sometimes, genius strikes. This moment of sudden comprehension is known as 
insight, is assumed to follow from restructuring processes and is often accompanied by an 
Aha! experience (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). Insightful problem solving is a fundamental 
thinking process and nearly one century of psychological research has been dedicated to 
demystifying it (Bowden et al., 2005), yet the true nature of the insight phenomenon remains 
elusive (see Chu & MacGregor, 2011, for a review). 
The feeling of suddenly knowing the solution to a problem is generally accompanied 
by a strong affective response and a certainty that the solution is correct (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1995). Furthermore, insight is thought to be based on underlying restructuring 
processes (Duncker, 1945; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ohlsson, 1992). Following the Gestalt 
psychologists’ understanding of restructuring, Ohlsson (1992, p.12 and p.40) defined it as “a 
change in the perception of a particular object, situation or problem - as seeing the problem in 
a new way”. In general, restructuring occurs when prior knowledge is altered or when crucial 
information that has not been noticed before is added to the mental representation of a 
problem. More specifically, the representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et 
al., 1999) assumes that prior knowledge and inappropriate assumptions result in self-imposed 
constraints that establish a biased representation of the problem (or the goal) and thus prevent 
a solution. One possibility to change the biased representation (to restructure it) is by 
constraint relaxation, i.e. the over-constrained assumptions must be relaxed. For example, in 
Katona’s Triangle Problem (1940), participants were asked to build four equilateral triangles 
with only six matchsticks. This problem is unsolvable in a two-dimensional problem 
representation. It is necessary to overcome the self-imposed “two-dimension” constraint and 
search for a solution in a three-dimensional representation where the problem can be solved 
by building a tetrahedron. 
As Kounios and Beeman (2009) point out, the phenomenon of insight occurs in a 
number of domains: generating creative ideas, solving tricky problems, identifying a blurry 
object (Bowers et al., 1990), grasping the meaning of metaphors and jokes (Ritchie, 2004) or 
modifying dysfunctional thinking patterns in psychotherapy (Beck, 1976).  
In the past, researchers have confined themselves to investigating restructuring and 
insight mostly in the framework of a small set of insight problems. Reviewing the tasks 
available so far, MacGregor et al. (2008) identified a need for new sources of insight 
problems and suggested rebus puzzles as one potential addition. Another relatively new set of 
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problems, already widely used (e.g. Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 
2008), are Compound Remote Associates (CRA) problems. In these tasks, three words are 
presented and participants are asked to find a compound word that relates to all three of them 
in a meaningful way, e.g. given the words pine, crab and sauce, the correct solution would be 
“apple” with the resulting compounds: pine apple, crab apple, and apple sauce. They were 
adapted from the Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1962) by Bowden and Jung-Beeman 
(2003a). However, like so many classical problem solving tasks, both of these are restricted to 
verbal material and rely on access to an answer that is already stored in memory (the solution 
word) rather than on the generation of a truly novel solution. In the spatial domain, matchstick 
arithmetic tasks (Knoblich et al., 1999) are an important and relatively new contribution. Still, 
although the use of these tasks has brought forward fruitful results, it seems appropriate to 
take a more unconventional approach beyond the problem domains used so far to better 
understand the underlying cognitive processes in insight problem solving (Knoblich et al., 
2001; Öllinger et al., 2006, 2008). 
 
2.2.1 Restructuring in Magic Tricks 
We propose a new task domain to investigate insight: Magic tricks. The ancient art of 
conjuring could perhaps be called “applied psychology” in the sense that magicians 
systematically exploit the limitations of human visual perception and attention. Magicians 
manipulate higher cognitive functions like reasoning by deliberately evoking inappropriate 
constraints in spectators that prevent them from seeing through the magic trick. The 
experiment begins when the curtain is raised – and, just as any skilled experimenter, the 
magician keeps improving his methods from performance to performance based on the data 
(feedback) that is provided by the audience and their reactions. 
Historically, psychologists’ attempts to link magic and psychology date as far back as 
the 19th century (Jastrow, 1888). More recently, it has been suggested that magic techniques 
could be adopted as research tools for cognitive science and first studies have already been 
published in the field of visual attention with special magic tricks as stimuli (e.g. Kuhn & 
Tatler, 2005; Kuhn & Land, 2006; Kuhn, Tatler, et al., 2008; Parris et al., 2009; Kuhn et al., 
2010). These studies demonstrate how magic tricks can be utilized to learn more about human 
visual perception and attention (see Kuhn, Amlani, et al., 2008, for a thorough discussion).  
In the present study, we take this one step further by presenting magic tricks and 
asking participants to find out how the trick worked, i.e. which method was used by the 
magician to create the magic effect. We assume that if people overcome the over-constrained 
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problem representation induced by the magician and find the “solution” of a magic trick, this 
should be the same process as restructuring in insight problems. We see two main reasons 
why such a task domain of “solving” magic tricks is well suited to investigate restructuring 
processes: 
First, similar to classical insight problems (Weisberg, 1995), the domain of magic 
tricks also takes advantage of the fact that people’s prior knowledge activates self-imposed 
constraints (Ohlsson, 1992; Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009). Besides sleight of hand, many magic 
tricks exploit implicit assumptions of the spectator as part of their methods (e.g. if someone 
makes a throwing motion, he will throw a ball). The magician benefits from the fact that these 
constraints are activated highly automatically and that it is very hard to overcome them 
(Tamariz, 1988). Consequently, the search space (Newell & Simon, 1972) for possible 
explanations of an observed trick is fairly constrained. In contrast to insight research, the 
magic problem does not consist of a riddle, a puzzle or a task, but instead it is consolidated by 
the discrepancy between the observed event with unexpected outcome (Parris et al., 2009) and 
the prior knowledge activated by such an apparently familiar event. This discrepancy often 
leads the magician’s audience into an impasse – a state of mind in which people are 
completely puzzled and have no idea how this magic effect could possibly have taken place. 
To overcome such an impasse and find the solution, the over-constrained assumptions must 
be relaxed (Ohlsson, 1992; Öllinger et al., 2008).  
Second, a magic trick can be considered as a highly intriguing problem, which 
strongly motivates the observer to find a solution. Observing something impossible happening 
right in front of our eyes poses a challenge for our rationality, and therefore, after the first 
sensation of wonder and astonishment has passed, the situation is critically analysed. Anyone 
who has ever witnessed a magic performance, will remember the strong desire to know how 
the magic effect is achieved (the usual response being “Let me see that again!”). The spectator 
simply can not believe his eyes and asks for a second chance to find an explanation. Of 
course, magicians rarely offer such second chances, but that is exactly what we did in the 
present work.  
We infer from the first point that gaining sudden insight into the inner working of a 
magic trick is based on restructuring. This does not exclude that tricks can also be solved in a 
more analytical and step-wise way, as also discussed in classical insight problems (Metcalfe, 
1986; Weisberg, 1995; Evans, 2008). To measure restructuring, we will use the subjective 
Aha! experience as a classification criterion to differentiate between insight solutions 
(solutions accompanied by an Aha!) in contrast to noninsight solutions (solutions without 
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Aha!). That is, we adopted the frequently and successfully applied procedure (e.g. Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006, 2008) introduced by Bowden (2005; 2007) of 
asking participants directly if they had experienced an Aha! or not. As a manipulation check, 
we assessed participants’ feeling of certainty for each solution, expecting that insight 
solutions would be connected to a high rating of certainty because this aspect (i.e. the strong 
feeling that the solution is correct) is stressed in the instruction (see general method, 2.3.3). 
For our experimental rationale, it is important to note that each magic trick consists of 
an effect and of a method (Tamariz, 1988; Ortiz, 2006). The magic effect is what the observer 
perceives (e.g. the vanish of a coin) and the method is how the trick works, the secret behind 
the effect (e.g. skill, mechanical devices, misdirection). Conjurers employ a method to 
produce an effect (e.g. Lamont & Wiseman, 1999). Typically, the magician tries to guide the 
spectators’ attention away from the method and towards the effect. In the present study, 
participants experienced the effect and were then asked to discover the method.  
A second important point to consider is that in contrast to most verbal puzzles or 
riddles, magic tricks do not have one clear unambiguous solution. Of course, for each magic 
trick, there exists one true solution, that is, the method that was actually used by the magician. 
Still, other methods to achieve the magic effect might be conceivable (Tamariz, 1988). In fact, 
almost every conjuring effect can be achieved by several different methods, for example, 
Fitzkee compiled a list of possible methods for 19 basic effects that comprises 300 pages 
(Fitzkee, 1944, quoted according to Lamont & Wiseman, 1999, p. 7). Which method is 
applied by the conjurer depends on the individual strengths of each method and on the exact 
performing situation (e.g. large vs. small audience). Participants might find the true solution, 
but might perhaps also come up with another plausible solution or alternatively, a solution 
that is actually impossible (given the information from the video clips). 
An example of a magic trick illustrates our account (trick #20, see appendix A. The 
full video clip can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B6ZxNROuNw). A coffee 
mug and a glass of water are presented to the audience. The magician pours water into the 
mug, as depicted in the left panel of figure 4. Holding the mug with his arms stretched, the 
magician snaps his fingers - then he turns the mug upside down and a large ice cube drops out 
(figure 4, right panel). In a few seconds, the water has turned into ice. How does this work?  
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Figure 4. Example of a magic trick. Screenshot from the beginning (left panel) and from the end of the trick 




Most people react with astonishment and disbelief because according to their prior 
knowledge, this is not possible (Parris et al., 2009). Water can turn into ice, but not in such a 
short period of time (at room temperature), and additionally, it does not turn into a perfect ice 
cube by itself. Seemingly, causal relationships and laws of nature that were acquired through 
past experience have been violated (Parris et al., 2009; Ohlsson, 1992). An artful magician 
induces the impression that he controls the natural laws in a supernatural way and can bend 
them as he wishes. Besides astonishment, the spectator is faced with the open question of how 
the magician did the trick. Trying to answer this question, the observer analyses the situation 
and initiates attempts to find an explanation. A problem is consolidated that must be solved. 
In this problem solving process, the observers’ prior knowledge imposes an over-
constrained problem representation (Knoblich et al., 1999). Wrong assumptions turn into 
constraints that restrict the search space and prevent the spectator from seeing through the 
trick. These assumptions are skilfully evoked by the magician, for example:  
 
1, The mug and the glass are real, ordinary objects 
2, The water is real water 
3, The mug is empty 
4, The water is poured into the mug 
5, It is a real ice cube 
6, There is no water left in the mug after the ice cube has fallen out 
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Some of these assumptions may be correct, but others are wrong, and these are the crucial 
assumptions that create the magic effect. They have become constraints that must be relaxed 
in order to discover the method. 
In the present example, only the third assumption is wrong. The “empty” mug is 
actually filled with a piece of special white napkin, glued to the bottom of the mug, and the 
ice cube. Because the inner side of the mug is also white, the observer can neither detect the 
napkin nor the transparent ice cube if the mug is kept in motion while casually showing it 
empty. The water is indeed poured into the mug, but is fully absorbed by the napkin. And 
voilà, only the ice cube falls out when the mug is turned upside down –it’s magic! 
We argue that if the observer achieves to overcome the initial constraint (empty mug), 
his search space is restructured (Wertheimer, 1959) and new solution possibilities are opened 
up allowing him to find the correct solution (napkin) or to think of other possibilities to 
contain the water (e.g. double bottom). 
Taken together, we claim that a magic trick can be regarded as a challenging problem, 
and that the spectator takes the role of a problem solver who attempts to find out how the 
magician did the trick. The following flowchart (figure 5) illustrates the interplay between the 
magician’s actions and spectator’s experience. 
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Figure 5. Interaction between magician and observer. A magic trick is performed by the conjurer, who uses a 
secret method (e.g. skill, mechanical devices, misdirection). The spectator observes the magic trick and 
experiences the magic effect (e.g. a violation of laws of nature or a logical impossibility). Relevant cognitive 
processes assumed to be active in the spectator are depicted that eventually might lead to a solution of the 
problem. Please note that insight solutions as well as noninsight solutions can be either true or false (see 2.4.1). 
 
 
Introducing a new task, the present study asks whether magic tricks are appropriate to 
investigate insight problem solving. As one possible indicator to differentiate insight from 
noninsight problems, participants’ IQ (Raven Matrices, SPM-Plus, Raven, 2008) was assessed 
to analyse its influence on solving performance and in particular, on the frequency of 
solutions obtained through sudden insight. Gilhooly et al. (2005) found that problem solvers’ 
Raven scores account for a high proportion of variance in noninsight problems, but not in 
insight problems (but see Chein, Weisberg, Streeter, & Kwok, 2010, for an alternative 
interpretation of these results). Specifically, we therefore expected to find no correlation 
between IQ scores and the occurrence of insight solutions. Besides testing the feasibility of 
our new paradigm, we aim at providing a proof of concept that solving magic tricks reliably 
elicits insight. 
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2.3 General Method 
 As noted above (1.7), all the data presented stems from one large study comprising 
several different parts. The procedure of each individual part is only described once, namely 
in the methods of the respective manuscript. However, the present section provides also 
shared methodological details such as a description of the sample and stimuli and the main 
task (solving magic tricks). Figure 6 provides an overview of the experimental design of the 
study. There were two separate testing sessions with 14 days delay.  
 
 
   
Figure 6. Overview of the experimental design. The study consisted of two separate testing sessions with 14 




50 healthy volunteers, most of them students (mean age 24.4 ± 3.3; range from 20 to 
33, 16 male), were recruited through announcements at the University of Munich and were 
paid 32 € for their participation. After giving informed consent, each participant was tested 
individually. None of them had any neurological diseases and all had normal or corrected-to-
normal acuity. All participants returned for session 2 exactly 14 days after the first testing 
time point. Two participants were excluded because they did not solve any of the presented 
tasks, resulting in a final sample size of 48.  
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2.3.2 Stimuli 
With the aid of a professional magician (TF), a careful pre-selection of magic tricks 
was conducted with regard to sensory as well as cognitive requirements: Only visual effects 
that could be performed in absolute silence, with no other interactive elements necessary (e.g. 
assistant, interaction with the audience). We used short tricks, with only one effect and one 
method. 40 magic tricks were selected and recorded in a standardized setting, again with the 
magician TF. We ran three pilot studies on another sample of 45 students to ensure that the 
tricks were understandable, i.e. that participants perceived the intended magic effect. Tricks 
were also rated with regard to the extent of surprise that they caused (see appendix A). Three 
tricks that turned out to be not feasible for a filmed performance were eliminated, and 17 
tricks had to be improved in a second recording session (e.g. better camera angle). The final 
number of stimuli was 34 (plus 3 for practice trials). The video clips that ranged from 6 s to     
80 s were presented on a 17” computer screen displayed by the Presentation® software 
version 12.1. The tricks covered a wide range of different magic effects (e.g. transposition, 
restoration, vanish) and methods (e.g. misdirection, gimmicks, optical illusions) and are listed 
in detail in appendix A. 
 
2.3.3 Procedure Session 1 
Participants were seated in a distance of 80 cm in front of a computer screen. After 
filling in an informed consent, participants were orally instructed by the experimenter. Their 
task was to watch magic tricks and to discover the secret method used by the magician. 
Following Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s approach (2007), participants were asked to 
categorize their solution experiences into insight and noninsight solutions. As already noted in 
1.5.1, the instruction for these judgements read as follows (adapted from Jung-Beeman et al., 
2004): “We would like to know whether you experienced a feeling of insight when you 
solved a magic trick. A feeling of insight is a kind of “Aha!“ characterized by suddenness and 
obviousness. Like an enlightenment. You are relatively confident that your solution is correct 
without having to check it. In contrast, you experienced no Aha! if the solution occurs to you 
slowly and stepwise, and if you need to check it by watching the clip once more. As an 
example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on all at once in contrast to slowly dimming it 
up. We ask for your subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha! experience or not, there is no 
right or wrong answer. Just follow your intuition.” The experimenter interacted with 
participants until they felt prepared to differentiate between these two experiences.  
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After three practice trials, a randomized sequence of 34 magic tricks was presented. If 
a trick was solved, participants had to indicate on a trial-by-trial basis whether they had 
experienced an Aha! during the solution. If participants failed to solve the trick, the video clip 
was repeated up to two more times while solving attempts continued.  
As soon as they had found a potential solution, participants were required to press a 
button. The button press stopped the video clip and terminated the trial. A dialogue with the 
following question appeared: Did you experience an Aha! moment? Participants indicated 
Yes or No with a mouse click. Subsequently, they were prompted to type in their solution on 
the keyboard and gave a certainty rating of how confident they felt about the correctness of 
their solution on a scale from 0 to 100%. Figure 7 illustrates the procedure. 
 
 
    




 Please note that participants never received any feedback about the accuracy of their 
solutions. To control for familiarity of tricks, at the end of the experiment participants 
received a questionnaire with screenshots from all 34 tricks and were asked to indicate 
whether the solution to a trick was previously known to them. These tricks were excluded on 
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an individual level and handled as missing data. In addition, the Raven Matrices (SPM-Plus, 
Raven, 2008) were administered as a measure of fluid intelligence. Participants were 
instructed according to the manual and completed the Raven test in approximately 45 
minutes. Session 1 lasted about two hours. 
Trick repetition: Solving a magic trick is arguably a very difficult task. Therefore, we 
improved observers’ chances of discovering the method by breaking an old magicians’ rule: 
Never show the same trick twice! For the reader interested in magic, please consult Lamont et 
al. (Lamont, Henderson, & Smith, 2010) for a critical discussion of that point. First evidence 
that trick repetition increases the likelihood of detecting the method was provided by Kuhn 
and Tatler (2005). In a pilot study (see 2.3.2), we confirmed this finding and could show that 
in about 50% of trials, participants were able to detect the method after one repetition of the 
trick. In the present paradigm, to increase the overall solution rate, each trick was repeated up 




2.4.1 Data Analysis 
Participants solved magic tricks and categorized their solutions into insight (with 
Aha!) and noninsight solutions (without Aha!), therefore the condition (insight or noninsight 
solution) was determined by participants’ responses (binary data). Solution Rate (number of 
solved tricks), Solution Accuracy (true or false) and Presentation (number of times that the 
trick was presented until participants solved the trick or until they failed after the third 
presentation) were the dependent variables. Repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) of the mean number of solved tricks were used for statistical analyses.	  All p-values 
are Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
Participants’ solutions were coded off-line as true or false by two independent raters, 
Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of inter-rater reliability was 0.99. True solutions were 
identical with the procedure that the magician had actually used. False solutions consisted of 
methods that were impossible with respect to the conditions seen in the video clip. If no 
solution at all had been suggested, the tricks were coded as unsolved. 
In some trials (5.4% of all solutions), participants suggested an alternative, but 
potentially conceivable method (see introduction, 2.2.1). We added those to the true solutions 
category. Adding them to the false solutions category instead, would not have changed the 
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results in any way. Furthermore, a small percentage of all trials (5.2%) had to be discarded 
because the tricks were already familiar to participants. 
 
2.4.2 Solution Rate and Accuracy 
For this analysis, results were collapsed over repetitions. 45.8% of all trials (34 tricks 
x 48 participants yielded a total of 1632 trials) were not solved, i.e. participants watched the 
trick three times without suggesting a solution. Those trials were excluded from further 
analyses because no insight could occur. In 49%, participants suggested a solution (coded as 
either true or false). For 41.1% of the solved magic tricks, participants had reported insight. 
The remaining 58.9% were classified as noninsight solutions. Figure 8 shows the percentages 
of true and false insight and noninsight solutions. The ratio of true/false solutions clearly 
varies between the two solution categories (15.6/4.6% vs. 16.1/12.7%). 
 
 
       
 
Figure 8. Overview on the data from session 1. Mean percentages of not solved and solved tricks, and their 
proportion of true and false solutions in the insight and noninsight categories. True insight solution: true or 
plausible solution + reported Aha! experience; False insight solution: impossible solution + reported Aha! 
experience; True noninsight solution: true or plausible solution, without Aha! experience; False noninsight 



















	   42 
An ANOVA for repeated measures with the factors Solution Type (insight vs. 
noninsight) and Solution Accuracy (true vs. false) was conducted, with the number of solved 
tricks as dependent variable. It revealed a significant main effect of the factor Solution Type 
(F(1, 47) = 7.18, p < .05, η2partial = .13) with more noninsight than insight solutions and a 
significant main effect of Solution Accuracy (F(1, 47) = 37.05, p < .01, η2partial = .44) with 
more true than false solutions. In addition, this analysis indicated a significant interaction 
between the two factors (F(1, 47) = 12.47, p < .01, η2partial = .21). Figure 9 depicts the mean 




Figure 9. Mean number of solved tricks (out of 34) as a function of Solution Type and Accuracy. Error bars 
denote standard errors of the mean. Grey bars indicate true solutions, black bars false solutions. Significant 
differences are marked with an asterix. 
 
 
Follow-up t-tests showed that there were significantly (t(47) = 7.35, p < .01, Cohen’s 
dz = .98) more true insight solutions (M = 5.29, SD = 3.91, grey bar) than false insight 
solutions (M = 1.56, SD = 1.83, black bar). This is in contrast to noninsight solutions with no 
significant difference between the number of true (M = 5.48, SD = 3.0) and false (M = 4.33, 
SD = 2.73) solutions. Therefore, the significant main effect of the factor Solution Accuracy is 
based on solutions obtained through insight.  
 
* 
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2.4.3 Trick Repetition 
Tricks were presented up to three times, a trick could thus be solved during the first, 
second or third presentation. To investigate the influence of repetition on the ratio of insight 
vs. noninsight solutions, again using the number of solved tricks as dependent variable, we 
conducted an ANOVA for repeated measures with the factors Solution Type (insight vs. 
noninsight) and Presentation (Pt1, Pt2 and Pt3) that yielded significant main effects for both 
factors (Solution Type, F(1, 47) = 7.12, p < .05, η2partial = .13, and Presentation, F(2, 94) = 
82.42, p < .01, η2partial = .64). The first main effect was already described. For the main effect 
of the factor Presentation, follow-up paired t-tests showed that significantly less tricks were 
solved in Pt1 (M = 1.1, SD = 1.6) than in Pt2 (M = 7.8, SD = 3.5) with t(47) = 14.16, p < .01, 
Cohen’s dz = 1.9 and also significantly less than in Pt3 (M = 7.8, SD = 3.3) with t(47) = 
11.97, p < .01, Cohen’s dz = 1.8. There was no significant difference between Pt2 and Pt3. 





Figure 10. Mean number of solved tricks (out of 34) as a function of Solution Type and Presentation. Error bars 
denote standard errors of the mean. Black bars depict the number of solutions during the first presentation of the 
trick, light grey bars depict solutions during the second presentation and dark grey bars depict solutions during 
the third presentation. 
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There was a significant interaction, F(2, 94) = 32.31, p < .01, η2partial = .41. Insight 
solutions occurred most frequently during the second presentation of the trick (bar shaded in 
light grey) and then during the third presentation (bar shaded in dark grey). For noninsight 
solutions, this pattern is reversed. We can also see the main effect (only very few solutions 
during the first presentation, black bars). Therefore, depending on the number of repetitions of 
the trick, the ratio between insight and noninsight solutions varied significantly.  
 
2.4.4 Individual Performance 
On an individual level, we correlated the number of solved tricks (a measure that is 
independent from whether the produced solution was true or false, as described in the 
response coding procedure) with the percentage of reported insight solutions (using the 
percentage instead of the total number of insights corrects for the individually varying 
solution rates) and found that high solution rates are associated with high percentages of 
insight solutions (see figure 11). This relationship is significant (r = .31, p < .05). Regardless 
of the accuracy of those solutions, participants who solved many tricks showed a tendency to 
experience more insight events. 
 
               
Percentage of restructuring solutions


























Figure 11. Positive correlation between individual solving rate (averaged number of solved tricks, out of 34) and 
percentage of insight solutions. Each black dot corresponds to one participant. 
 
Percentage of insight solutions 
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To control for the influence of demographic variables (age, sex, education) as well as 
of participants’ IQ (as measured by the Raven Matrices, SPM-Plus, Raven, 2008) on 
performance in our new paradigm, correlations were calculated. None of these variables did 
influence the number of insight solutions or the solving performance (number of solved 
tricks). A significant positive correlation between the educational level and the solving 
performance (r = .45, p < .01) was the only exception. That is, a high level of education was 
associated with a high number of tricks solved.  
As a manipulation check, participants were asked to give certainty ratings for each 
solution, indicating on a scale from 0 to 100% how confident they felt about the correctness 
of the respective solution. Comparing the mean certainty of insight solutions (mean rating of 
84.62%) to the mean certainty of noninsight solutions (63.08%), a significant difference (t(45) 




We introduced magic tricks as a new problem solving domain and tested if this could 
be an appropriate paradigm to study insight problem solving.  
In 41.1% of all solutions, participants reported an Aha! experience, which was used as 
an indicator for the occurrence of insight. Since this is the first problem solving study with 
this stimulus material, no direct comparisons are possible – but the present occurrence of 
insight events is slightly lower than in studies using a different problem solving domain 
(verbal puzzles). For example, Subramamian et al. (2009) report that 50.8% of all solutions 
were rated as insightful. Participants in a study by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) indicated insight 
for 56% of all solutions, Kounios et al. (2008) report identical numbers. Sandkühler and 
Bhattacharya (2008) found that 55.6% of all solutions were insightful ones (operationalized as 
involving high ratings of suddenness). By definition, insight is a rare event. That our 
participants rated less solutions as insightful might be accounted for by task characteristics 
that lead to greater difficulty levels in attaining an insightful solution. In particular, the 
requirement of producing a truly novel solution rather than just retrieving a well known 
solution word could make magic tricks more difficult than verbal puzzles like the frequently 
used RAT (Mednick, 1962). In any case, only future studies using the same problem solving 
task will allow a comparison of results. The present study aimed at providing a proof of 
	   46 
concept and we argue that the new paradigm elicits a sufficient number of insight events for 
that. 
49% of the presented tricks were solved and we found significantly more true 
solutions than false ones. This shows that our magic trick paradigm is feasible and of 
appropriate difficulty. 
Comparing the two solution types with respect to their accuracy, we found a different 
ratio of true to false solutions in each solution category. Insight solutions were significantly 
more often true than false, whereas noninsight solutions were equally true or false. 
Consequently, insight seems to be mainly connected to true solutions. Assuming that full 
insight into a problem is based on restructuring, this result becomes clear. “To gain insight is 
to understand something more fully” (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995, p. 37) and insightful 
problem solving requires a deeper or more appropriate understanding of the problem 
(Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008). Without restructuring, the chances for producing a true 
or a false solution were nearly even. At least for the domain of magic tricks, this finding 
suggests a clear advantage of insightful problem solving over more analytical ways of 
thinking.  
Another possible explanation for the significant interaction between Solution Type 
and Solution Accuracy might be that noninsight solutions reflect participants’ tendency to 
provide rather a “confabulated” solution than no solution at all – and in many cases (12.7% of 
all trials), this confabulated solution, obtained through a more analytic, not truly insightful 
strategy, was in fact false.  
Another finding has also interesting theoretical implications. Remarkably, in the 
present experiment, 4.6% of all trials consisted of false insights, i.e. trials in which 
participants solved the trick, indicated that they had experienced insight, but suggested a 
methodically impossible solution. The existence of false insights has been debated, for 
example Sandkühler (2008, p.2) states that “a true insight must lead to a correct solution”. 
The Gestalt psychologists assumed that restructuring “always moves towards a better 
structural balance”, believing in a “certain infallibility in restructuring” (Ohlsson, 1984a, p. 
68). This is in accordance with the immediate feeling of certainty (Sternberg & Davidson, 
1995) that is often reported after insightful solutions (as it was the case in the present study, 
too). In contrast, Sheth et al. report the occurrence of incorrect solutions that were rated as 
highly insightful by problem solvers (2009, p. 1273). Ohlsson (1984a, quoted in Ohlsson, 
1992, p. 3) originally defined insight as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of the 
complete and correct solution”. Acknowledging the existence of false insights, he later stated 
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in a revision of his theory that the criterion of correctness of a solution is not useful for a 
definition of insight (Ohlsson, 1992). His conclusion that correctness of solution is a 
“contingent characteristic which accompanies some insights but not all” (1992, p. 3) is clearly 
supported by our data. We conclude that the present findings prove the existence of false 
insights, but show that they are far less likely than true insights.  
These results also correspond to the certainty judgements collected from participants 
after each solution. As expected, the mean certainty for insight solutions was significantly 
higher than the one for noninsight solutions showing that participants actually followed the 
instruction criteria. Summing up, if participants had found a solution through insight, they felt 
more certain about it and in fact, the solution was more likely to be the true one. If 
participants had found a solution through a more analytical way of thinking, they felt less 
certain and indeed, they produced more false solutions.  
The repetition data revealed another important difference between the two solution 
types: Insight solutions were reached earlier than noninsight solutions. The present paradigm 
involved up to three presentations of the magic trick (which could be solved during any of 
these three presentations). Clearly, during the 1st presentation (Pt1), hardly any tricks were 
solved (on average, for both solution types together, only 1.1 tricks). Participants first had to 
understand the magic effect, and most trick clips ended a few seconds after the magic effect 
had taken place, leaving no time for any problem solving attempts. Therefore, during Pt1 it 
was too early to understand the method. The significant interaction between Solution Type 
and Presentation reveals a more fine-grained pattern of results. Insight solutions occurred 
more often in Pt2 than Pt3, but for noninsight solutions, this pattern was reversed (more 
noninsight solutions in Pt3 than Pt2). Increasing the number of repetitions reduced the 
frequency of spontaneous insights into the inner working of the trick, and instead fostered 
more analytical problem solving strategies. We explain this finding in the following way: 
Watching Pt2, many participants gained sudden insight into the trick (insight solution). But if 
participants did not experience insight during Pt2, they instead formed various hypotheses 
about possible solutions, i.e. analytical problem solving attempts began. Consequently, 
solutions found during Pt3 could not be classified as insight solutions anymore, because they 
were not sudden, but based on previous solving attempts and the systematic exclusion of 
hypotheses. Therefore, if more repetitions than three were included in an experimental 
paradigm, we would predict even less insight events with increasing repetitions.  
Analysing the data on an individual level, we found that high solution rates are 
associated with high percentages of insight experiences. This effect is surprising, because 
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considering the significant main effect (insight < noninsight), a negative correlation would 
have been expected. That is, participants who provided solutions to many tricks (regardless of 
whether these solutions were true or false) were more likely to solve them via insight. Note 
that this finding is independent from solution accuracy, because the solution rate measure 
includes both true and false solutions. 
Based on the findings presented so far, we can now discuss our proposal of using 
magic tricks as a new task domain for insight research. 
We found that magic tricks can be solved either with or without insight, just like other 
tasks that are used to investigate insight (e.g. CRA problems, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 
2003b). This is advantageous because it allows for a comparison of both processes (insight 
and more strategic, analytical problem solving) without changing the type of problem used. 
From a theoretical point of view, our results support the idea that any given problem may 
pose representational obstacles for some solvers, but not for others (Ash et al., 2009) and 
therefore may be solved through insightful processes or through more analytical processes 
(Bowden et al., 2005).  
As predicted, participants’ fluid intelligence score (Raven matrices) was not correlated 
to the occurrence of insight solutions. This finding further supports our account of magic 
tricks as an insight problem solving task for which performance is supposed to be independent 
from intelligence measures (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). 
To better understand why a magic trick is a difficult problem solving task, we may 
refer to the distinction made by Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) of three difficulty factors in 
insight problems. Their findings were based on the 9-dot-problem only, but this distinction 
seems plausible with respect to other problem solving tasks, too. Although perceptual factors 
(Köhler, 1921) and process factors (Newell & Simon, 1972) are clearly important for our new 
task domain, we specifically selected certain kinds of magic tricks so that the problem 
difficulty was determined by knowledge factors. Note that it is not a lack of knowledge, but a 
biased representation of information (compare figure 5) that hinders the observer from 
discovering the method. 
Our results provide first evidence for the utility and great potential of magic tricks as a 
problem solving domain. Further studies are warranted to test other theoretical assumptions 
like imposed constraints and inappropriate problem representation. For example, a possible 
next step would be to investigate problem solvers’ constraints in more detail to find out which 
types of constraints exist, how they are imposed and finally overcome. Because the 
constraints encountered by problem solvers are known (and exploited, see introduction, 2.2.1) 
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by the magician, magic tricks represent an ideal domain to systematically manipulate them. 
This idea will be further elaborated at the end of this thesis (section 6.4). We conclude that the 






























3 IT’S A KIND OF MAGIC – NEW INSIGHTS INTO                
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3.1 Abstract 
 Insightful problem solving is a vital part of human thinking, yet difficult to grasp. 
Recent neuroscientific studies rely on the Aha! experience as subjective classification 
criterion for solving a problem with or without insight. However, the concept of Aha! is rather 
vague and relies on face validity. Assuming a multidimensional construct, we aim to 
systematically explore the phenomenology of Aha! by breaking it down into five previously 
postulated dimensions. As a new approach, 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 
50 participants who had to find out how the magician accomplishes the trick, and to indicate 
whether they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. To obtain a detailed 
characterization of individual Aha! experiences, participants then had to perform a 
comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment which was repeated after 14 days to 
control for its reliability. 41.1% of solutions were accompanied by an Aha! experience. The 
quantitative assessment remained stable across time in all five dimensions. Participants 
reported more emotional than cognitive aspects, with happiness as the most important 
dimension. We demonstrated that despite its subjective character, the Aha! experience is 
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3.2 Introduction 
Sometimes, the solution to a difficult problem pops into mind suddenly (J. E. 
Davidson, 1995) and unexpectedly (Metcalfe, 1986). Ever since the Gestalt psychologists 
(Köhler, 1921; Duncker, 1945; Wertheimer, 1959) began to investigate problem solving, the 
phenomenon of insight has been of great interest to psychologists (Sternberg & Davidson, 
1995). Insight is often reported to be accompanied by an affective response, the “Aha! 
experience” (e.g. Gick & Lockhart, 1995). This is taken as the discriminative criterion to set it 
apart from analytic and gradual problem solving (Metcalfe, 1986; Evans, 2008). From an 
information processing account, insight is assumed to be closely linked to an underlying 
restructuring process (Ohlsson, 1992).  
Bühler provided the first reports about Aha! experiences in thinking, describing a 
moment “in which suddenly, the lights come on” (translated from Bühler, 1907, p. 341). 
Traditionally, it has been regarded as an interesting epiphenomenon of insight (e.g. Ormerod, 
MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002) or even the defining feature of insight (Kaplan & Simon, 
1990; Gick & Lockhart, 1995) that defies closer empirical inquiry due to its subjective nature. 
For a long time, the Aha! experience „has been neglected as being too warm and soft for cool, 
hard Cognitive Science“ (Metcalfe, 1995, p. xi), but meanwhile, the importance of this aspect 
has been recognized (e.g. Gick & Lockhart, 1995). Furthermore, the recent interest in possible 
neural correlates of insight has led to a surge in studies that presuppose the subjective Aha! 
experience to be the clearest observable aspect of insight (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). 
Consequently, problem solvers’ individual judgements of the subjective experience of an 
Aha! are indispensable for those studies to classify a solution as insightful and to distinguish 
it from solutions without insight (Bowden et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 
2009). Despite its successful use as a solution type classification criterion and its importance 
for the interpretation of almost all neuroscientific studies on insight problem solving (e.g. 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008), the Aha! 
experience, as far as we know, has not been investigated in more detail. One hindrance is the 
methodological difficulty of its assessment (e.g. introspective judgements about the 
occurrence of Aha!), another one might be conceptual problems (what defines an Aha! 
experience?). Although the cited studies rely heavily on reported Aha! experiences, there is 
no general and explicit agreement on a definition of this concept. The common denominator 
is that an Aha! occurs if a solution suddenly pops into mind. Other aspects like a feeling of 
surprise, certainty that the solution is correct or a gestalt-like quality of the solution are 
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stressed or disregarded to various degrees across studies (Ohlsson, 1992; Sandkühler & 
Bhattacharya, 2008; Bowden et al., 2005). The theoretical assumption that prior impasse is a 
necessary precondition for Aha! experiences to occur (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 2001; 
Jones, 2003; Öllinger et al., 2006) is taken up by some (e.g. Schooler et al., 1993; Sandkühler 
& Bhattacharya, 2008) and questioned by others (e.g. Bowden et al., 2005). The conceptual 
vagueness makes it very difficult to compare findings across studies, and thus it seems critical 
to further elucidate the phenomenology of this special experience (compare Gick’s call, 1995, 
for further research on the affective aspects of problem solving). 
The aim of the present study is to provide a detailed analysis of the Aha! experience 
during sudden moments of insight. We assume a multidimensional model where the interplay 
of different components establishes the Aha! experience. We will assess the relative 
importance of the involved components, using a two-fold approach:  
•  Qualitative assessment: Free self-reports obtained from participants will be analysed 
and categorized. 
•  Quantitative assessment: Five previously postulated dimensions are subjected to a 
rating of importance by participants (compare Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008). 
The qualitative assessment was conducted as follows: Directly after the end of the 
experiment, participants were given the opportunity to describe their thoughts and emotions 
during insight moments by introspectively reporting on their subjective Aha! experience. This 
self-report was performed prior to the quantitative assessment to avoid possible transfer 
effects (so that participants could freely describe their actual experience without being 
influenced by the given dimensions). 
For the quantitative assessment, we used five dimensions of the Aha! experience that 
were postulated previously: 
1. Suddenness: That insightful solutions are experienced as very sudden was 
demonstrated by Metcalfe (Metcalfe, 1986; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) who showed that 
although problem solvers are able to accurately judge their progress towards solution 
(recorded in feeling-of-warmth ratings) for noninsight problems, they are unable to do so for 
insight problems. This finding was further confirmed by Davidson (1995). 
2. Surprise: Based on introspection and informal observation, Gick and Lockhart 
(1995) suggest a division of the Aha! experience in two components: Surprise and 
suddenness. In their account, the surprise aspect can vary by strength and it can be 
accompanied by either positive (delight) or negative (chagrin) emotions. In order to 
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disentangle surprise from these accompanying emotions, we decided to assess the emotional 
component separately, adding “Happiness” as a new dimension.  
3. Happiness: Because Gick and Lockhart (1995) proposed the emotional response to 
vary between the positive and negative pole, we used a scale with “unpleasant” and 
“pleasant” as two extremes. There is also anecdotical evidence for this dimension of the Aha! 
experience, for example Gruber (1995) who analyzed Darwin’s notes from the time of his 
great discovery on 28th September, 1838 and from them, inferred “a state of elevated 
happiness” (1995, p. 425).  
4. Impasse: Ohlsson postulated that prior impasse is a necessary precondition for Aha! 
experiences to occur (1992). An impasse is defined as a state of mind where problem solving 
behaviour ceases (Ohlsson, 1992; Öllinger et al., 2008; Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008). 
Measuring participants’ eye-movements while they were solving insight problems, Knoblich 
et al. (2001) found an increase in the number of long fixation times for successful solvers. The 
longest fixation times occurred shortly before a solution was found. This means, directly 
before insight occurred, there was a phase without systematic eye-movement patterns. This 
was interpreted as an “idling” phase in which more appropriate representations could be 
established that yield a new insight. 
5. Certainty: Obviousness of a solution, i.e. the strong feeling of certainty that an 
insightful solution is correct, was stressed as an additional aspect by Bowden and Jung-
Beeman (2007). This “intuitive sense of success” related to insightful solutions is also often 
described in the context of scientific discoveries (Gick & Lockhart, 1995, p. 215).  
 
Adopting a similar procedure from MacGregor and Cunningham (2008) who collected 
a global self-rating of insight after participants had worked on several different insight 
problems, we decided to conduct both the qualitative and the quantitative assessment in a 
comprehensive manner after all tasks were completed. This procedure of asking participants 
to report their overall feeling of Aha! allowed us to collect the most basic, overarching 
characteristics of the insight experience, independent from individual fluctuations caused by 
differences between single problems (e.g. a very difficult task in contrast to a less difficult 
one that might lead to less strong Aha! experiences). 
 Furthermore, we aim at providing empirical support for Bowden’s claim (2005) of the 
reliability of subjective judgements (Aha! vs. no Aha!) in insight research by demonstrating 
that participants’ quantitative ratings are temporally stable. The differential assessment of the 
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five dimensions was therefore repeated after a two week delay to allow a comparison with the 
first rating time point. The present study addresses the following two hypotheses:  
1. Multidimensionality: We will show that the Aha! experience is a syndrome of well-
defined characteristics. Assuming multidimensionality, we hypothesize that all five 
dimensions should be equally important. 
2. Reliability: We will investigate if quantitative ratings of Aha! experiences are stable 





This data is based on the same 48 participants which are described in the general 
method section (2.3.1). 
 
3.3.2 Stimuli 
The testing material consisted of 34 video clips of magic tricks. Stimulus development 
and a complete list of the tricks are described in detail in 2.3.2. The magic tricks were 




There were two separate testing sessions with 14 days delay (see figure 6 for an 
overview of the entire study). In session 1, participants’ task was to watch video clips of 
magic tricks and to think of a solution how the trick could work. If participants failed to solve 
the trick, the video clip was repeated up to two more times while solving attempts continued. 
If a trick was solved, they had to indicate on a trial-by-trial basis whether they had 
experienced an Aha! during the solution. Participants’ faces were filmed with a digital camera 
throughout the experiment. After completing all tricks, participants were asked to evaluate 
their Aha! experiences. 14 days later, participants were invited again for a second assessment. 
Session 1 (magic tricks and Aha! assessment) lasted two hrs and session 2 (re-assessment of 
Aha! experience) lasted 1 hr. In addition, session 2 included a recall of solutions. This part of 
the method and the corresponding data will be presented in chapter 4. 
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3.3.3.1 Session 1: Magic tricks 
For the procedure of session 1, please refer to 2.3.3. 
 
3.3.3.2 Session 1: Assessment of Aha! experience  
3.3.3.2.1 Session 1: Qualitative assessment (”Free self-report”) 
 After completing all 34 magic clips, participants were asked to give introspective self-
reports (“Think of the feelings of Aha! that you have just experienced during the experiment. 
Now, please describe these Aha! experiences in your own words!”). Participants used the 
keyboard for typing in their descriptions. There was no time limit for this task. 
 
3.3.3.2.2 Session 1: Quantitative assessment (”Rating of importance”) 
Subsequently, participants had to rate their experience on five different dimensions 
(“Please rate your Aha! experiences by selecting a position on each of these scales!”): 
Suddenness (slow solution - fast solution), Surprise (not surprising - surprising), Happiness 
(unpleasant - pleasant), Impasse (no impasse - impasse), Certainty (uncertain - certain). For 
each dimension, a visual analogue scale was displayed on the screen. As default, the cursor 
was set in the middle of the scale and participants moved it along the scale using the mouse to 
select a position. The left end of the scale corresponded to a value of 0 and the right end to a 
value of 100, but participants did not see any numbers. Participants were instructed to refer 
only to their Aha! solutions, not to the noninsightful solutions. The screen showed the words 
“Please rate your Aha! experiences!” above the visual analogue scale for each dimensions’ 
rating. 
To control for familiarity of tricks, at the end of the first session participants received a 
questionnaire with screenshots from all 34 tricks and were asked to indicate whether the 
solution of a trick had been known to them previously. These tricks were excluded on an 
individual level and handled as missing values (5.2% of all trials).  
 
3.3.3.3 Session 2: Re-Assessment of Aha! experience  
To control for its stability across time, the same qualitative and quantitative Aha! 
assessment was conducted 14 days later. The procedure was identical to session 1. Again, 
participants were explicitly asked to refer to the Aha! experiences they had had during the 
experiment (now two weeks ago) and to describe them from memory.   
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Data Analysis 
 Only the data from the Aha! assessment is relevant for the present research question 
and presented here. For a detailed analysis of solution rates, solution accuracy, trick 
repetition, individual performance and influence of demographic variables, please refer to 
chapter 2 (section 2.4). Note that for 41.1% of all solved magic tricks, participants indicated 
that they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. Of course, the subsequent 
assessment of the Aha! experience referred only to those events.  
 The quantitative data was analysed with a repeated measures ANOVA of the mean 
rating across participants, followed by pair-wise post hoc comparisons (t-tests) between the 
five individual dimensions. The qualitative data was analysed with McNemar tests. All p-
values are Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
 
3.4.2 Assessment of Aha! Experience 
3.4.2.1 Reliability of quantitative Aha! ratings across time 
Participants had rated their individual Aha! experience on five different dimensions 
(1st rating), with a repetition after a 14 day delay (2nd rating). We addressed the stability of 
those ratings by comparing the two time points. For six participants, the second rating was 
missing.  
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Figure 12. Comparison of the averaged 1st (circle) and 2nd (triangle) Aha! rating for each dimension. For each 
time point, the mean rating across participants is depicted. Horizontal bars denote standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the 2nd rating does not differ substantially from the 1st rating. 
This observation was statistically confirmed by a repeated measure ANOVA with the factors 
Session (two levels: session 1 and session 2) and Dimension (five levels: suddenness, 
surprise, happiness, impasse and certainty) that revealed no significant main effect for the 
factor Session (F(1, 41) = 1.1, p = .3). Thus, participants’ ratings remained stable across 14 
days. 
There was a significant main effect for the factor Dimension, F(4, 164) = 16.43, p < 
.01, indicating that there were differences between the dimensions. We will focus on the two 
dimensions that significantly differed from all others, those with the highest (Happiness) and 
the lowest (Impasse) rating, respectively. Pair-wise post hoc comparisons revealed that the 
dimension Happiness (mean rating of 88.5%) was rated significantly higher than all other 
dimensions (all p < .05). Impasse ratings were in general lower (mean of 60.9%), and differed 
significantly from all other dimensions (all p < .05). Thus, the feeling of being stuck in an 
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3.4.2.2 Categorization of statements from the free self-reports 
Each of the 48 participants produced a free report of their individual Aha! experiences 
that was repeated after a 14 day delay (again, for six participants the second rating was 
missing). The full statements from all participants are provided in appendix B (translated from 
German). These statements were sorted into five main categories (see below). In order to 
implement this without any a priori assumptions about the nature of Aha! experiences, the 
categories were compiled by a rater who was blind to the experimental rationale, based solely 
on the statements of the 1st evaluation. This means, the rater read all statements from the 1st 
evaluation and then collapsed them into meaningful, self-created categories. Subsequently, 
using a rating scheme with these self-created categories, three independent raters categorized 
all statements (both 1st and 2nd evaluation). A categorization was valid if at least two of the 
three raters assigned the same category for one statement. Each of the participants’ statements 
could be assigned to more than one category, because often, several different aspects 
(belonging to different categories) were mentioned in the self-reports. 
1. Cognitive Aspects 
a. Elaboration (compare Ohlsson, 1992): A solution is found because a crucial 
detail is detected 
b. Restructuring (compare Ohlsson, 1992): A new way of looking at the problem, 
separate parts suddenly fit together, everything falls into place 
2. Emotional Aspects 
a. Happiness: Feelings of joy, contentment, pleasure, positive arousal 
b. Tension Release: Strain is released, feelings of relaxation and relief 
c. Performance-related Emotions: Pride, drive, increased motivation, 
competitiveness, satisfaction 
3. Somatic Reactions: Physiological arousal or other reactions related to the body 
4. Reproduction of Instruction: To enable participants to classify their solutions as 
insightful (with Aha!) or not insightful (without Aha!), it was necessary to provide 
them with a standard description of an Aha! experience (see general method, 2.3.3). If 
participants simply repeated parts of that description, this category was assigned, 
including the following aspects: Suddenness, rapidness, clarity of solution, certainty 
about the correctness of solution, light bulb metaphor and common conceptions of 
Aha! experiences (e.g. “struck by lightning, the penny has dropped”). 
5. Other: Rest category 
 
	   60 
3.4.2.3 Analysis of statements from the free self-reports 
 Table 1 shows how often the aspects had been named and provides one prototypical 
example each. 
 
Table 1. Categorization of free Aha! evaluations with prototypical examples taken from participants’ statements 
(translated from German). Their corresponding frequencies are listed separately for the two evaluation time 
points, as well as summed up (last column). 
 
# Category Example 









I detected a small detail and 
suddenly, the things that I had 
observed previously make sense. 




What in the beginning didn’t fit 
together suddenly makes sense. 




I am happy and get into a good 
mood. 









- I was much more motivated to 
continue working on the task. 
- Like a competition between me 
and the magician, and in Aha! 
moments, I felt like the winner. 
- I feel so much more intelligent. 








I suddenly feel an enlightenment. 29 22 51 




 Σ 92 Σ 78  Σ 170 
  
 
 For the 1st evaluation, comparing the cognitive and the emotional categories (1a+1b 
vs. 2a+2b+2c) with a cross tab, we found that 24 participants mentioned emotional aspects 
(but no cognitive ones) whereas only 5 participants mentioned cognitive aspects (but no 
emotional ones). This difference was significant (McNemar test, p < .01).  
After two weeks, this difference was even more pronounced: For the 2nd evaluation, 30 
participants mentioned emotional, but no cognitive aspects (in contrast to only 2 participants 
with the reverse pattern), and the McNemar test was significant with p < .01. 
Regarding the three emotional subcategories, clearly the most relevant aspect was 
happiness (mentioned 43 times). Performance-related emotions (24 times) and the feeling of 
tension release (19 times) seemed to be equally important aspects of the Aha! experience.  
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Apart from reproductions of the instruction, which dealt mainly with the solution 
strategy used (Aha! vs. more analytic solving styles), only few cognitive aspects were 
mentioned.  
Somatic reactions were only mentioned by three participants at each time point. Two 
statements were from the same participants, i.e. at the 2nd evaluation, two participants 
described the same physiological reactions as they had during the first one. In the first case, 
this was “a slight pull in my chest and tummy”, and the second participant expressed the 
feeling “like a shot through my body”. 
Category 4 was used as a manipulation check. Obviously, participants remembered the 
instruction well or used the same characteristics, with 51 total instances of naming one of 
these aspects. 
 
3.4.3 Behavioural Aspects 
 The video recordings of participants’ behaviour during the solution process may serve 
to illustrate the emotional response following Aha! experiences. Here we present two 
paradigmatic cases (figures 13 and 14). The participants shown gave written consent for the 
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Insight solution 
        
        
Figure 13. An insight solution. Stills from the video recordings that were run during the entire experiment. The 
behavioural response of two participants directly before (left panel) and after (1 s later, right panel) an insight 
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Noninsight solution 
        
        
Figure 14. A noninsight solution. Stills from the video recordings that were run during the entire experiment. 
The behavioural response of two participants directly before (left panel) and after (1 s later, right panel) a 
noninsight solution is shown. 
 
 
Comparing the right upper panel of figure 13 with the right upper panel of figure 14, there are 
striking differences in the behavioural response of the same participant. In both cases, the 
participant is shown 1 s after she discovered the secret method of a magic trick, but in figure 
13, she later reported her solution as being “insightful” (with Aha! experience), whereas in 
figure 14, she classified it as noninsight solution. We can see that the participant reacts quite 
differently, with a positive affective response to the insight solution (figure 13) that is 
completely missing for the noninsight solution (figure 14). The other participant (lower panel) 
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3.5 Discussion 
 The present study aimed at providing evidence for the assumed multidimensionality of 
the Aha! experience during sudden moments of insight. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
this multidimensional construct could be broken down into five dimensions of equal 
importance. Furthermore, we predicted that quantitative ratings of Aha! experiences would be 
stable across time. The new stimulus domain proved to be well suited to reliably trigger Aha! 
experiences, since 41.1% of all solutions were classified as Aha! solutions. Results from the 
quantitative rating of these Aha! experiences will be considered first. 
Our hypothesis of equal importance was not confirmed. Instead, we found one 
prevailing aspect: Happiness was rated higher than all other dimensions. Therefore, in our 
paradigm, a pleasing feeling seems to be the most important characteristic of the Aha! 
experience. This primacy of positive emotions is also reflected in participants’ qualitative 
statements, as discussed below.  
Impasse was rated lower than all other dimensions, thus this aspect appears to be less 
important than previously thought (Ohlsson, 1992). This might be attributed to our new 
stimulus domain. We argue that watching a magic trick directly puts the observer in a state of 
impasse – namely in the first moment of astonishment and wonder about the magic effect. At 
first, the observer is left completely baffled, without any solution prospect. But later, after the 
problem solving process has been initiated, participants don’t necessarily experience an 
impasse. This finding is in accordance with results from a study on the Candle Problem 
(Duncker, 1945) by Fleck et al. (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004) who found only few instances of 
impasse in verbal protocols obtained during the problem solving process. 
The 2nd quantitative rating did not differ from the 1st in any dimension (see figure 12), 
therefore participants’ ratings of Aha! experiences remained stable across time. To evaluate 
such a fleeting moment by pinpointing several dimensions on a scale is arguably quite a 
difficult task. It is thus impressive that participants were able to recall their Aha! experience 
so vividly after 14 days that they rated it in the same way as before. This finding provides 
empirical support for Bowden’s claim (2005) for the usefulness and reliability of self-reports 
in insight research.  
A weakness of our visual analogue scale is the lack of negatively poled questions, 
reflected in the answers’ general trend towards the positive pole. The temporal stability of the 
ratings might thus partly be explained by reduced variability caused by this positive bias. 
Another alternative explanation for the ratings’ stability must also be considered: It is 
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conceivable that participants did not actually remember their Aha! experiences, but instead 
reported what they remembered reporting in session 1. However, this seems unlikely for two 
reasons: First, to make it difficult to remember the previous rating, we had deliberately 
implemented a visual analogue scale without any numbers. There was only a white line on 
which the red cursor had to be positioned by moving the mouse along the line. In this way, 
participants could never know the value to which the selected position corresponded and 
could therefore not retain any numbers, only a visual image of the scale. We argue that it is 
nearly impossible that participants were able to retain this visual impression for two weeks for 
five different dimensions. Second, participants were clearly instructed to remember the actual 
Aha! experience, not the previous rating. Nothing could be gained from disobeying this 
instruction, since there was no reward connected to the outcome. We conclude that the finding 
of no differences between the two rating time points shows that the method of directly 
questioning participants yields temporally stable indicators of the occurrence of Aha! 
experiences. 
In order to obtain further information about the actual experience of problem solvers, 
participants were asked for a free verbal description of their Aha! experiences, directly after 
the experiment, before being presented with the presupposed dimensions. Of course, this self-
report might not be completely free, but could have been influenced by the previous 
instruction. Therefore, we included only statements that had not been part of the instruction 
(compare general method, 2.3.3). A qualitative analysis of this data revealed positive 
emotions (mentioned in 25% of all statements) as the prevailing aspect of Aha! experiences. 
This is in accordance with results from the quantitative ratings in which the dimension 
Happiness was of highest importance. This statement from one of the participants may serve 
as an illustration: “A moment of bliss. I am happy and get into a good mood.” (compare 
appendix B). With the present analysis, we provide empirical evidence for the occurrence of 
strong positive emotions during sudden moments of insight.  
Now we will consider two new aspects that were mentioned in participants’ free self-
reports: Performance-related aspects (14%) and a feeling of “release of tension” (11%). The 
comparably high frequency of performance-related statements (e.g. “I feel really clever now” 
or “The magician can’t fool me anymore because by now, I could do the trick by myself”) 
was not expected, and might be attributed to the special task situation with our problem 
solvers being confronted with the magician as a kind of “rival” and thus engaging in a 
competition with him. Therefore, they might be only task specific and we would not expect 
similar reactions to classic insight puzzles without any opponent. 
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We found evidence for another new aspect, tension release, with 11% (19 out of 170) 
of the Aha! descriptions focusing on this feeling (e.g. “I feel relieved and relaxed now” or 
“feeling of relief after a phase of strain caused by failure”). It seems plausible to assume that 
tension arises if there exists no obvious solution for a problem. During unsuccessful problem 
solving attempts, the tension builds up further. If at last, quite unexpectedly, a solution is 
found, the tension will rapidly decline. Apparently, this is an important aspect still missing 
from current definitions of the Aha! experience. 
We sought to compare our empirical findings with theoretical assumptions. Ohlsson 
(1984a) summarized the Gestalt psychologists’ major ideas about restructuring and insight in 
a set of principles. There are some overlaps with aspects found in the free self-reports: In 
category 2c (performance-related emotions), participants repeatedly described heightened 
motivation (“I am much more motivated to continue working on the task”). This closely 
resembles proposition N (Ohlsson, 1984a, p. 70) in which an “energizing effect on problem 
solving behaviour” is described.  
Other aspects also match Ohlsson’s descriptions: “Recentering as a displacement of 
attention from one part of the situation to another […] reveals what the central part of the 
situation really is” (Ohlsson, 1984a, p. 70). This corresponds to category 1a (elaboration) and 
matches the idea of selective encoding (J. E. Davidson, 1995). Selective encoding means that 
certain features which were not obvious before (and not encoded) are suddenly detected by 
the problem solver as relevant for a solution. For example, one of our participants noted that 
“Through a detail, the entire action sequence becomes clear”.  
In comparison to emotional aspects, cognitive aspects of the Aha! experience were 
mentioned less often. A possible explanation might be that the affective response felt more 
prominent so that participants “forgot” to report their thinking patterns or problem solving 
strategies. Or, even more likely, since the instruction (see general method, 2.3.3) was centred 
around cognitive aspects like suddenness and certainty about solution, perhaps participants 
felt obliged to describe “new”, namely emotional aspects, which had not been part of the 
instruction. We should also keep in mind that about 50% of participants actually mentioned 
“suddenness”, but that this was rated as mere reproduction of the instruction.  
With respect to future experiments, we point out that there is a wealth of information 
to be gained through subjective self-reports. Most participants took several minutes to 
diligently describe their thoughts, using vivid and expressive language (compare participants’ 
full descriptions in appendix B). We recommend the use of such direct, qualitative self-
reports as a promising tool to learn more about the subjective phenomenology of Aha! Of 
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course, there are obvious limitations to such an introspective method: It is highly subjective, 
and general conclusions can only be drawn with caution. Durso even suggested that because 
participants were shown to be unable to correctly judge their progress toward a solution 
(Metcalfe, 1986), “…self-reports following insight are equally unreliable.” (Durso et al., 
1994, p. 94). Yet we argue that for the elusive phenomenon of insight, subjective Aha! reports 
might provide information that would not be accessible through more rigorous experimental 
methods. Other researchers have already successfully used verbal protocols to elucidate the 
processes during insight problem solving (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; 
Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; see also Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011, for a recent meta-analysis 
on verbalization procedures in general). We suggest that the traditional approach of using pre-
defined “insight problems” and assuming the occurrence of insight in the case of a solved 
problem, without taking into account participants’ individual problem solving experiences, 
should always be complemented by subjective measures (e.g. Aha! self-reports, detailed Aha! 
evaluations, thinking-out-loud protocols) obtained from participants.   
Comparing participants’ behaviour (recorded on video tape) directly after insight and 
noninsight solutions further validates the strong emotional impact of Aha! experiences. The 
affective response to solutions found through insight is reflected in smiling, laughter and other 
positive facial expressions whereas the responses to noninsight solutions are less strong or 
completely missing. A quote from one of our participants may serve to illustrate this: 
“Explosively, the bad feeling of frustration and confusion turns into a feeling of happiness 
and I feel a swell of pride.” 
 In sum, the present results provide evidence for the multidimensionality of the Aha! 
experience and point to a feeling of happiness as the prevailing characteristic. This primacy of 
positive emotions was found in qualitative as well as in quantitative ratings, although two 
different methods were used (free self-reports and ratings on a visual analogue scale with 
fixed dimensions). By revealing the temporal stability of individual Aha! ratings, we could 
show that despite its subjective character, the Aha! experience is a clearly measurable factor. 
An interesting question for future research is whether these findings would also apply to 
classical insight problems. Another open question concerns the possible influence of 
personality variables. We speculate that personality differences might lead to differential 
emphasis on each of the five dimensions of the Aha! experience. This study demonstrates that 
the Aha! experience should not only be regarded as an interesting epiphenomenon or trial-
sorting criterion, but that the phenomenon itself can be investigated systematically and fruitful 
results can be gained.   
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4.1 Abstract 
 The present study investigates a possible memory advantage for solutions that were 
reached through insightful problem solving. We hypothesized that insight solutions (with 
Aha! experience) would be remembered better than noninsight solutions (without Aha! 
experience). 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 50 participants as a problem 
solving task, asking them to find out how the trick was achieved. Upon discovering the 
solution, participants had to indicate whether they had experienced an Aha! during the solving 
process. After a delay of 14 days, a recall of solutions was conducted. Overall, 55% of 
previously solved tricks were recalled correctly. Comparing insight and noninsight solutions, 
64.4% of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, whereas only 52.4% of all noninsight 
solutions were recalled correctly. We therefore demonstrated a facilitating effect of previous 











Own contribution remark: The research questions were put forward by Dr. Michael 
Öllinger and myself, and discussed with Prof. Benedikt Grothe. The idea of using magic 
tricks came from me. Selection, recording and preprocessing of magic tricks was carried out 
by the magician Thomas Fraps and myself. The experiment was jointly designed by Dr. 
Michael Öllinger and myself. Matus Simkovic was of great help in programming the 
experiment. All data presented in this thesis was collected by myself. Eline Rimane and Timo 
Schiele served as raters for the magic trick solutions. I conducted the behavioural data 
analysis and discussed it intensely with Dr. Michael Öllinger. The EEG data analysis was 
conducted in collaboration with Dr. Björn Schelter at the Center for Data Analysis and 
Modeling in Freiburg. All three manuscripts, including creation of figures, were written by 
myself.  
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4.2 Introduction 
In contrast to analytical problem solving, insight problems are characterized by a 
sudden, unexpected solution that is often accompanied by a so-called “Aha! experience” 
(Metcalfe, 1986; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). Implicitly, it is often assumed that insightful 
experiences lead to strong memory effects. For example, insight tasks like the nine-dot 
problem (Scheerer, 1963) are never presented without controlling for prior exposure to the 
problem. Already at the dawn of insight research, Köhler (1921) reported that his apes were 
more efficient (shorter solution times compared to the first attempt) in re-solving problems to 
which they had previously found an insightful solution.  
Still, there is a scarcity of studies explicitly addressing this question (Dominowski & 
Dallob, 1995). An exception is a recent study from Dominowski and Buyer (2000) revealing 
near-perfect performance in several insight problems which had been successfully solved one 
week before. This “re-solution effect” was not present if participants had failed to solve a 
problem and then had been shown the solution. This finding was explained by differences 
between solvers and nonsolvers with regard to their mental representation of a problem, with 
the solvers building a better integrated and more complete representation. 
The idea that Aha! experiences lead to a facilitation of later recall was first posited by 
Auble et al. (Auble, Franks, & Soraci, 1979). They presented participants with initially 
incomprehensible sentences, followed by a cue that revealed the meaning of the sentence. 
There was a facilitating effect on immediate recall of sentences with Aha! in contrast to 
sentences without Aha! (Aha! was defined as initial noncomprehension of a sentence 
followed by comprehension – please note that this differs substantially from the present 
conceptualization of an Aha! experience, as outlined below). Since participants were not 
asked about their understanding of the sentence until after the cue was presented 5 s later, 
possible attempts to solve the problem without cue were not assessed. Therefore, Auble’s 
findings are limited to cued solutions and thus only concern the phenomenon of “outsight” 
(aptly termed so by Sheth et al., 2009, in contrast to “insight”). We agree with Luo and 
Knoblich who state that “without doubt, the phenomenon of interest is internally generated 
insight.“ (Luo & Knoblich, 2007, p. 79). Consequently, we decided to use a paradigm in 
which no cues were provided, so that all solutions might be found by participants themselves 
(self-generated).  
Wills et al. (Wills, Soraci, Chechile, & Taylor, 2000) investigated self-generated 
insight with pictorial stimuli in the context of the “generation effect”, a memory advantage for 
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self-generated over provided items. They found a facilitating effect on immediate recall for 
connect-the-dot pictures that were drawn by participants (connecting dots until the full picture 
appeared) in contrast to a presentation of the already complete picture. It was argued that this 
result was mediated by the Aha! that participants could only experience in the first condition, 
when the figure became suddenly identifiable during drawing.  
To conclude this overview, there is first evidence that insightful experiences facilitate 
recall of initially uncomprehended stimuli in the verbal (sentences) and visual (pictures) 
domain. An impressive recall performance was demonstrated, too, for solved classical insight 
problems. However, from our point of view, there is one limitation common to all reported 
studies: A failure to distinguish between insight and noninsight solutions. We agree with 
Bowden and colleagues (Bowden et al., 2005; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007) in their 
argument that any problem can be solved with insight, but also without insight. Following this 
rationale, a direct assessment of the occurrence of insightful experiences is required which 
poses methodological challenges, but might lead to more valid results. Please refer to section 
1.5.1 for a detailed discussion of that issue. We regard the subjective Aha! experience as the 
clearest defining characteristic of insight problem solving (Gick & Lockhart, 1995) that 
accompanies only insightful solutions, and follow Bowden’s recommendation (2005) of using 
participants’ subjective reports of Aha! experiences to sort solutions into insight (Aha! 
reported) and noninsight solutions (Aha! not reported). The occurrence of an insight 
experience is thus directly determined by the problem solver. If its occurrence is simply 
assumed without direct feedback from the problem solver, as it was done in previous work 
(Auble et al., 1979; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; Wills et al., 2000), it is difficult to claim 
that the reported findings actually stem from insightful experiences. To our knowledge, the 
present study is the first one that, with the purpose of investigating memory effects, 
differentiates between insight and noninsight solutions, using direct Aha! judgments by 
participants. 
In the present work, we will investigate a possible memory effect in the problem 
solving domain. We address the question whether gaining sudden insight into the solution of a 
difficult problem yields strong and long-lasting memory effects, facilitating subsequent recall 
of a solution.  
Besides empirical findings, our hypothesis is theoretically motivated by Knoblich’s 
account (Knoblich et al., 1999) who claimed that the representational change (Ohlsson, 1992) 
underlying insightful experiences leads to persisting changes in the representation of a 
problem (transfer hypothesis). Confirming this claim, at least for short time intervals, they 
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could show transfer effects from one solved problem to others with the same source of 
difficulty. The basic idea is that the successful solution of an insight problem is preceded by a 
change of the problem and/or goal representation. Those representational changes persist over 
time. For example, in the nine-dot problem, solvers realize that they have to overcome the 
virtual boundaries of the nine-dot square. They relax a constraint (the virtual boundaries), and 
this constraint stays relaxed. Therefore, later on, they will be able to remember that the 
boundaries must be transgressed (i.e. transfer takes place). We will try to extend these 
findings not by investigating short-time transfer from one problem block to another within 
one experimental session, but by introducing a rather long delay (14 days) and asking for a 
recall of solutions to previously solved problems. To reach this aim, the newly developed 
problem solving domain of magic tricks will be used. Participants watch magic tricks and are 
asked to find out how the magician achieves the magic effect. We argue that magic tricks are 
especially well suited to investigate representational change, because in order to gain insight 
into the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints (as outlined 
in greater detail in 2.2.1). 
In addition, the subjective Aha! experience can lead to strong emotional responses 
(Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) which might further strengthen the 
memory trace (for a review, see LeDoux, 1996, 2000).  
Specifically, we hypothesize that insight solutions (accompanied by an Aha! 
experience) will be remembered better than noninsight solutions lacking the Aha! experience. 
We base our hypothesis on two arguments: First, in noninsight solutions, no 
representational change occurred. Second, the Aha! experience together with its typical strong 
emotional response is lacking. If representational change and the experience of Aha! are 
indeed factors that lead to strong and long-lasting memory effects, we may expect better 
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4.3.2 Stimuli 
We investigated possible memory effects of insight in the new domain of magic tricks 
that was shown to trigger strong Aha! experiences (compare chapters 2 and 3). The testing 
material consisted of 34 video clips of magic tricks. Stimulus development and a complete list 
of the tricks are described in 2.3.2. The magic tricks were presented to participants as a 
problem solving task (“Please try to find out how the trick works!”). 
 
4.3.3 Procedure 
4.3.3.1 Session 1: Solving magic tricks 
The procedure of the experiment was already described in 2.3.3. Only one additional 
part that is relevant for the present analysis will be described here (compare figure 6). 
Providing solutions to unsolved tricks: After the screening for familiar tricks, 
individually for each participant, solutions to their unsolved tricks were revealed by 
presenting the same screenshots as in the familiarity questionnaire with a line of text that 
explained the solution. Although we were only interested in the recall of self-generated 
solutions (compare introduction, 4.2), this procedure was necessary to ensure that the memory 
load during recall was the same for each participant. In this way, all participants had to recall 
the solutions to 34 magic tricks during the second testing session. The recall data from 
unsolved tricks was not taken into account for the analysis. 
 
4.3.3.2 Session 2: Solution recall  
After 14 days, the second testing session was conducted. Participants were instructed 
to recall the solutions in the following way: “Two weeks ago, you observed magic tricks and 
were asked to find out how the magician achieves the magic effect. Either you found it out by 
yourself or you were shown the solution. Now we would like to know which of the solutions 
you can still remember. Please look at the pictures carefully and try to remember the solution, 
then type it in. If you can’t remember the solution, simply write ‘Forgot solution’. It is also 
possible that you have forgotten not only the solution, but the entire trick - please indicate 
these cases by writing ‘Forgot trick’.” Furthermore, it was stressed that they should not 
generate any new solutions, but only rely on memory. Again, the pictures used to control for 
familiarity (described above) were used as a reminder of the trick (a second viewing of the 
entire trick clip was avoided in order to prevent participants from creating new solutions 
while watching the clip). Participants viewed the trick pictures, typed their answers directly 
below the picture on the screen and proceeded to the next trick by pressing the enter button.  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Data Analysis 
The coding procedure for participants’ solutions was already described (see 2.4.1). 
Recall performance was coded as matched and failed by two independent raters (Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.99). Matched recall means that a participant recalled the same true or false solution 
as in session 1. The failed recall category comprised three cases: forgot trick, forgot solution 
or false memory (if solutions from session 1 and 2 did not match). 
Analysing the influence of insightful solution experiences on memory performance, 
we had to deal with the problem of varying solution rates across participants (ranging from 7 
to 27 solved tricks, with a mean of 16.7). To correct for this, the mean number of solved tricks 
for each factor level was weighted, participant-wise, with the participant’s individual solution 
rate. This means, for each participant, the absolute frequency of solved tricks in each category 
(e.g. true or false, insight or noninsight solution) was divided by the respective participant’s 
individual solution rate. The resulting value indicates which percentage of the individual total 
number of solved tricks falls into each category. For example, if participant A solved a total 
of 16 tricks, and 8 of them with insight, this would yield a percentage of 50% insight 
solutions, and the remaining 50% would consist of noninsight solutions. In this way, it could 
be assured that each participant contributed equally to the statistical analyses. The same 
rationale applies to the recall rate. Since every participant had solved a different number of 
tricks, the number of correctly recalled solutions (= matched recall) was dependent on the 
individual solution rate. For example, a participant who had only solved three tricks could not 
reach a higher number of correctly recalled tricks than three. To correct for this, the recall rate 
was also weighted with the individual solution rate, i.e. divided by it.  
A 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA of the weighted number of solved tricks was 
conducted, followed by paired t-tests. All p-values are Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
 
4.4.2 Data from Session 1: Solving Magic Tricks 
Please refer to figure 8 in section 2.4.2 for an overview on the data obtained in session 
1. The present study investigates self-generated insight and, specifically, the influence of 
Aha! experiences on subsequent recall. Therefore, trials with no solution were excluded from 
the analysis because no Aha! experiences could occur. The following analysis is based on the 
800 (49%) solved trials.  
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4.4.3 Data from Session 2: Recall Performance 
In session 2, participants had to recall their solutions. Figure 15 depicts the weighted 
mean number of solved tricks for each factor level (note that the percentages always refer to 
the total number of solved trials) and illustrates that overall, of all solved trials, more were 
recalled correctly (matched recall, 55%, in grey) than incorrectly (failed recall, 45%, in 
white), there were more noninsight solutions (61%, plain colour) than insight solutions (39%, 
striped) and more true (65%, right half of the circle) than false solutions (35%, left half).  
 
Figure 15. Overview on the data from session 2. Weighted mean number of solved tricks (in %) and their 




 Correcting for the overall lower occurrence of insight trials, we obtained the following 
values for a direct comparison between insight and noninsight solutions with regard to the 
number of matched recall events: 64.4% of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, 
whereas only 52.4% of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly. However, for 
statistical analyses, we had to take into account the variable Solution Accuracy and only 
corrected for the individual varying solution rates, but not for the lower occurrence of insight. 
A 2x2x2 ANOVA for repeated measures with the factors Solution Type (insight vs. 
noninsight), Accuracy (true vs. false) and Recall (matched vs. failed) was conducted, with the 
weighted number of solved tricks as dependent variable. It revealed significant main effects 
for two factors: Solution Type with F(1, 47) = 10.78, p < .01, η2partial = .19 and Accuracy with 
F(1, 47) = 45.99, p < .01, η2partial = .50. There was no significant main effect for Recall. 
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There were significant two-way interactions between Solution Type and Accuracy, 
F(1, 47) = 6.96, p < .05, η2partial = .13, Solution Type and Recall: F(1, 47) = 4.64, p < .05, 
η2partial = .09 and finally, between Accuracy and Recall: F(1, 47) = 36.03, p < .01, η2partial = 
.43. 
We wanted to investigate the influence of insight experiences (factor Solution Type) 
on subsequent recall of these solutions. But due to the significant interaction between 
Accuracy and Recall, the two factor levels of Accuracy (i.e. true and false solutions) must be 
considered separately, therefore figure 16 refers only to false solutions and figure 17 only to 
true solutions.  


































Figure 16. Recall of false solutions. The weighted mean number of solved magic tricks (in % of all 800 solved 
trials) is depicted as a function of Solution Type and Recall. Note that only false solutions are presented (see 
figure 17 for true solutions). Error bars denote standard errors of the mean. Significant differences between 
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Figure 17. Recall of true solutions. The weighted mean number of solved magic tricks (in % of all 800 solved 
trials) is depicted as a function of Solution Type and Recall. Note that only true solutions are presented. Error 
bars denote standard errors of the mean. Significant differences between matched (in black) and failed (in grey) 
recall are marked with an asterix. 
 
 Note that the number of solved tricks in each category (compare figure 15) was 
weighted by the individual solution rate of each participant, as described in section 4.4.1.  
A comparison of the two figures shows that in general, false (i.e. impossible) solutions 
(figure 16) are more likely to be forgotten (grey bars > black bars) whereas true solutions 
(figure 17) are more likely to be recalled correctly (black bars > grey bars).  
Due to the significantly higher number of noninsight solutions relative to insight 
solutions (see figure 15), we could not directly compare the number of matched / failed recall 
events between insight and noninsight solutions. For example, in figure 17, the percentage of 
matched recall events is about the same for insight and noninsight, but the two categories are 
not directly comparable because the insight category is based on a much lower number of 
trials (we would have to correct for the lower occurrence of insight trials, see above). 
Therefore, we asked if the ratio of failed / matched recall would be different in each of the 
two categories (insight and noninsight). Assuming a memory advantage for insight solutions, 
there should be more matched than failed recall events in the insight category, but not in the 
noninsight category. 
First, only false solutions are considered (figure 16): Follow-up paired t-tests yielded a 
significant difference between matched and failed recall solely in the noninsight category 
* 
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(t(47) = 2.63, p < .05, Cohen’s dz = .39) – in contrast to the insight category with no 
difference. Only 10.1% of noninsight, false solutions were recalled correctly, and for 16.1% 
the recall failed.  
 Second, only true solutions are taken into account (figure 17): Here, follow-up paired 
t-tests showed that insight solutions included a significantly higher percentage of matched 
recall (20.42%) than failed recall (9.61%) with (t(47) = 4.6, p < .01, Cohen’s dz = .61). For 
noninsight solutions, the percentages did not differ significantly.  
In sum, the present analysis revealed differential ratios of failed / matched recall in the 
two Solution Type categories with more matched than failed recall events for insight solutions 
(in the case of true solutions) and more failed than matched recall events for noninsight 
solutions (in the case of false solutions). We take this as evidence for a facilitating effect of 




The present work addressed the question whether gaining sudden insight into the 
solution of a difficult problem would facilitate the recall of these solutions relative to 
noninsight solutions. On average, participants were able to solve 49% of the presented tasks 
and recalled 55% of solutions. The rather low solution rate was expected, because we used 
real magic tricks that, of course, are difficult to solve. Previously, we had decided against 
eliminating extremely difficult ones, hoping that these might trigger especially strong Aha! 
experiences if solved. The present recall rate of 55% is much lower than the 98% found by 
Dominowski and Buyer (2000). We explain this by the higher number of problems 
implemented. Compared to the six insight problems used by Dominowski and Buyer, our 
participants had to keep in mind 34 different magic tricks including solutions. In contrast to 
their design, we did not present the entire problem again during recall, but only showed a 
reminder of the trick (a still from the video). This increased the number of failed recall events, 
because participants had forgotten a substantial amount of tricks. The low recall rate could 
also be attributed to the longer time delay (14 days instead of seven days).  
The data obtained confirmed our hypothesis. We predicted that insight solutions 
would be remembered better than noninsight solutions. Regarding only true solutions, it was 
found that insight solutions included a significantly higher percentage of matched recall 
(20.42%) than failed recall (9.61%). According to Cohen (1988), the corresponding effect size 
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of dz = .61 can be regarded as a strong effect. For noninsight solutions, no significant 
difference existed. Therefore, the previously experienced Aha! seems to lead to a memory 
advantage. 
 This finding extends the previously stated transfer hypothesis (Knoblich et al., 1999) 
to a much longer time delay (14 days) and to the recall of solutions to previously solved 
problems. It provides support for the proposal that the representational change (Ohlsson, 
1992) underlying insightful solving experiences leads to long-lasting changes in the 
representation of a problem that lead to full retention of the problem’s solution. 
One possible explanation for this finding could be the high emotional involvement 
(compare the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio, 1996) during an Aha! experience that 
might facilitate the retention of this solution in memory (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, 
& Yaniv, 1995). The case of posttraumatic stress disorder is one example for how strong 
emotions, experienced during the traumatic event, can hinder forgetting (e.g. Van der Kolk, 
1994). This is also meaningful from an anatomical perspective. It has been suggested 
(Öllinger, 2005) that during insight problem solving, there is an intense interplay between the 
hippocampus and the amygdala. The amygdala is known as a crucial region for processing of 
emotionally relevant stimuli (e.g. R. J. Davidson & Irwin, 1999) whereas the hippocampus 
subserves memory consolidation (e.g. Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). In an fMRI stuy, Luo 
et al. (Luo & Niki, 2003) detected hippocampus activity during insight problem solving of 
Japanese riddles. Still, since the neural basis of insightful experiences remains unclear (see 
Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, for a very thorough review), further research is warranted to confirm 
these speculative explanations. 
A pertaining methodological challenge in insight research is the question of how the 
occurrence of insight can be accurately assessed (Haider & Rose, 2007; Luo & Knoblich, 
2007). The present study demonstrates that the method of obtaining direct insight judgements 
from participants can reveal interesting differences between insight and noninsight events. Of 
course, a consequence of this procedure is that less trials are classified as “insightful”, 
compared to the traditional approach of simply treating all solved trials as insightful events. 
But in this way, we can be sure that the subjective insight experience is actually measured and 
this might help us to get a firmer grip on this elusive phenomenon. 
A drawback of the present study is the rather high number of false solutions (17.3% of 
all trials) that made it impossible to simply dismiss them. We therefore analysed true and false 
solutions separately and found differential ratios of failed / matched recall for insight and 
noninsight solutions in both cases. Interestingly, both patterns speak for the same facilitating 
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effect of insight solutions on recall performance, but one pattern is reversed to the other. In 
the case of true solutions, there are more matched than failed recall events for insight 
solutions. In the case of false solutions, there are more failed than matched recall events for 
noninsight solutions.  
In sum, using a new problem solving paradigm, the present work demonstrates that 
insight solutions are remembered better than noninsight solutions. This finding is in 
accordance with the theoretical assumption of representational change and the resulting 
transfer of knowledge about a solution. A replication of these results, also with stimuli from 
classical insight task domains, must be awaited and future studies addressing the neural basis 















5 NEURAL CORRELATES OF INSIGHT:                                     
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We conducted a pilot study in order to test a possible procedure to investigate the 
neural correlates of insight through electroencephalography (EEG) recordings. The aim was 
to search for a neural signature characterizing insight problem solving and specifically, the 
underlying restructuring process. There is some evidence that restructuring is detectable in the 




Attempts have been made at investigating the neural basis of insight problem solving 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and EEG. In a recent EEG study, 
Sandkühler et al. (Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008) used CRA problems (Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2003a) to disentangle the different components of the ongoing insight process. The 
most relevant component, namely restructuring, seemed to be related to an effect in the alpha 
frequency band (8-13Hz) that was apparent over right prefrontal regions. With the same 
stimuli, Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004) reported a sudden burst of gamma band activity 
(40Hz) in the anterior superior temporal gyrus (right hemisphere) about 0.3 s prior to the 
solution (only for insight solutions as compared to noninsight solutions). In the corresponding 
fMRI activity patterns, the same region seemed to be involved. These findings might indicate 
that the interplay between alpha and gamma activation characterizes the neural signature of 
restructuring. Alpha activity is suspected to desynchronize the existing mental representation 
of the problem. The following gamma synchronization might be a strong indicator for the 
integration of information that precedes the solution (see Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009). Luo 
and Knoblich (2007) measured participants’ brain activity at the moment of grasping the 
meaning of ambiguous sentences. In the fMRI part of the study, two main areas were found to 
be associated with that moment of insight: the anterior cingulate cortex and the left lateral 
prefrontal cortex. In an EEG experiment that was conducted in parallel, measuring event-
related potentials, they observed a more negative deflection in the time window of 250-500 
ms for insight versus noninsight events.  
However, despite these encouraging findings, Dietrich and Kanso have pointed out in 
their thorough review (2010) that no clear picture has emerged yet with regard to identifying 
crucial brain regions, not to speak of a distinct signature of this event in terms of neural 
activation patterns.  
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Using the new domain of magic tricks, we expected to find an alpha band 
desynchronization and a subsequent burst in gamma band activity as a possible neural 





Eight healthy volunteers (mean age 25.2 ± 2.3; two male) were paid 8€ per hour for 
participating in the experiment. None of them had any neurological diseases and all had 
normal or corrected-to-normal acuity. The design and procedure of the EEG study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.  
 
5.2.2 Stimuli 
In contrast to the procedure applied in the previous experiment (chapters 2-4), we now 
used additional stimuli, namely solution clips in which the solution to each magic trick was 
revealed. Thus, we investigated externally triggered insight. This allowed us to pinpoint the 
earliest moment in which participants could grasp the solution to one exact frame of the video 
clip. This was denoted as “earliest possible insight moment”. Based on data gathered in three 
previous pilot studies (see general method, 2.3.2), 18 of the magic tricks were specifically 
selected so that none of the tricks could be solved during the first presentation of the video 
clip.  
 
5.2.3 EEG Recording 
The EEG signal was recorded from 64 electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (Easy 
Cap), located at standard left- and right-hemisphere positions over frontal, central, parietal, 
occipital, and temporal areas (using the extended international 10/20 system sites). The 
horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded as the voltage between electrodes placed    
1 cm to the left and right of the external canthi to measure eye movements, and the vertical 
EOG was recorded from an electrode beneath the left eye, referenced to the right mastoid, to 
detect eye blinks. Trials containing these artefacts were excluded. EEG and EOG signal was 
amplified by a Brain Amp amplifier with a bandpass of 0.01–80 Hz, digitized at 1000 Hz by a 
PC-compatible computer, and averaged off-line.  
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 A time window of 0.5 s before the response (button press indicating the subjectively 
experienced moment of insight, as described in 5.2.4) until 0.5 s after the response was 
initially chosen for detailed analysis with Brain Vision Analyzer 1.05, because it has been 
shown that EEG components associated with insight begin approximately 0.3 s before the 
response (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).  
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Each participant went through one testing session of two hours (including application 
of electrodes), with 40 minutes for watching the 18 magic tricks and their solutions in 
randomized order. Participants were seated in a distance of 80 cm in front of a computer 
screen and instructed by the experimenter to watch the stimuli carefully. During the solution 
clip, they were required to indicate the moment of insight (when the solution is understood) 
by bi-manually pressing a button on the keyboard.  
This was the procedure of one trial: After a fixation cross of 1 s, a trick clip was 
presented on the screen, followed by another fixation cross, and a reminder screen “Now you 
will see the solution! Please press the button immediately when you understand how the trick 
works!”. Directly after the reminder, the respective solution clip was shown. During the 
solution clip, participants pressed the button once they understood the solution. This 
interrupted the solution clip, and triggered the following question screen: “Did you experience 
an Aha! moment?”. Participants indicated Yes or No with left/right button presses. After the 
answer, the solution clip continued until the end of the clip. Subsequently, the presentation of 
the next trick started with another fixation cross. The Presentation® 12.1 software was used 
for stimulus presentation and data collection. 
 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted in collaboration with Dr. Björn Schelter at the Center for 
Data Analysis and Modeling in Freiburg.  
Due to the small number of trials (n=18), computing standard event-related potentials 
was not meaningful. We therefore decided to use time-frequency analyses to look for sudden 
changes in the frequency bands of interest (alpha, 8-13Hz, and gamma, >30Hz) before or 
during the insight moment. Besides the traditional time–frequency analysis technique, the 
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short time Fourier transform, also wavelet analyses were used to break down the EEG signal 
into its frequency components (Samar, Bopardikar, Rao, & Swartz, 1999).  
The following time window (with respect to participants’ button press indicating that 
the solution had been understood) was initially chosen for analysis: -0.5 to 0.5 s. A second 
time window was used, of one second starting from the earliest possible insight moment. Data 
was averaged across all participants and analysed by time-frequency analyses. Later, the EEG 
signal was also averaged across tricks and time-frequency analyses were applied for each 




The procedure turned out to be not suited to produce reliable data. Our analyses 
yielded very heterogeneous activity patterns, varying from trick to trick. This means, 
dependent on the stimulus presented, a different pattern of frequency bands contributed to the 
signal. There are several possible sources of this variance: First, due to the large variance in 
reaction times (averaged across all 18 tricks, the mean standard deviation of participants’ 
reaction times was 3.4 s), the time window of -0.5 to 0.5 s around each participants’ response 
included different frames of the video clip. Therefore, averaging across participants yielded 
no meaningful results, because each participant saw a different stimulus display during the 
moment of insight. Second, averaging across tricks was also problematic, because EEG signal 
recordings largely differed between tricks. This is probably due to the heterogeneity of the 
magic trick stimuli themselves. Third, this variance could also be attributed to the influence of 
the dynamic, complex video stimulus itself, as compared to the mainly static stimuli 
commonly used in EEG studies.  
In sum, this pilot study showed that the current procedure could not be used to reveal 
any clear activity patterns related to the insight moment. We partly explain this by the 
heterogeneity of the magic tricks and conclude that a stimulus-based analysis is necessary to 
better understand the task before it can be used in a meaningful way to search for neural 
mechanisms underlying insight. Another explanation is that EEG recordings are too 
susceptible to the influence of dynamic stimuli. Therefore, for future research we recommend 
to use fMRI as an alternative method which has already been successfully used in studies with 
dynamic stimuli, even with magic tricks (Parris et al., 2009).  
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6.1 Critical Appraisal of the Magic Trick Paradigm 
The present thesis is concerned with insight problem solving. Magic tricks were 
introduced as a problem solving task, asking participants to find out how the trick was 
accomplished. Based on the representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 
1999), we argued that magic tricks are ideally suited to investigate insight because in order to 
gain insight into the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints 
through restructuring. The solving rate of 49% (with an insight rate of 41.1% of these 
solutions) provides evidence for our conception of magic tricks as an insight task and shows 
that the paradigm is of appropriate difficulty. In comparison with noninsight solutions, 
insightful solutions were more likely to be true and reached earlier.  
As detailed in 1.5.1, we adopted Bowden’s approach (Bowden et al., 2005) to 
determine the occurrence of insight. We combined this approach with an a priori selection of 
a task (magic tricks) that is likely to trigger misleading initial problem representations. That 
41.1% of trials were categorized as insightful indicates that our approach is feasible and 
replicates other findings using the same type of trial-wise insight judgements (Jung-Beeman 
et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008).  
We predicted (see 1.5.2) that magic tricks could also be solved through analytical 
solving processes and in fact, 58.9% of all solved trials were solved without insight. This 
finding can be explained in terms of the representational change theory. We argue that these 
are examples of cases in which no restructuring is needed because no constraints were 
activated, as suggested by Ohlsson (1984b). This means, in 58.9% of trials, problem solvers’ 
mental representation of the problem was not over-constrained, but already included the 
concepts which are relevant for a solution. Therefore, the solution could be discovered by 
analytic problem solving strategies, systematically checking different hypotheses, without 
restructuring the entire problem representation. From a theoretical point of view, our results 
support the claim that any given problem may pose representational obstacles for some 
solvers, but not for others (Ash et al., 2009) and therefore may be solved either through 
insightful processes or through more analytical processes (Bowden et al., 2005). For an 
insight task, the feature of two possible solving strategies (with and without insight) is 
advantageous, because both strategies can be compared while the task type remains constant. 
This is particularly helpful for studies tackling the neural basis of insight (as outlined in 6.4). 
In this respect, magic tricks are similar to CRA problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a) 
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which have already been successfully used to identify possible neural correlates (Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006).  
The data collected allowed us to establish a ranking order within the stimulus set of 34 
magic tricks with regard to solution rate and rating of insight (see appendix A). For future 
studies, the percentage of insight trials could be raised by specifically selecting only those 
magic tricks that have a low degree of difficulty as well as are frequently solved with insight. 
Since the aim of the present work was to introduce a novel paradigm, advantages and 
disadvantages of the magic trick task domain will now be discussed.  
From our point of view, the greatest advantage of using magic tricks as problem 
solving stimuli is that this offers access to problem solvers’ constraints. In terms of the 
representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999), prior knowledge can 
lead to constraints. We argue that magic tricks represent an ideal domain to access and 
systematically manipulate these constraints, because the very constraints that are encountered 
by the observer of a certain magic effect are well known to the magician. This is an advantage 
over other problem solving tasks like CRA problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a) or the 
nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930; Scheerer, 1963). For the latter problem, the main constraint is 
also known (i.e. to extend the lines across the imaginary boundaries of the square), but hint 
studies showed that relaxing this constraint is not sufficient for a solution (Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2004), so there must be additional, still unknown constraints. It should be noted that 
other insight problem domains exist which also allow a clear identification of constraints, for 
example matchstick arithmetic tasks (Knoblich et al., 1999). Furthermore, magicians 
deliberately strengthen these constraints by subtly evoking incorrect assumptions about the 
objects used. For example, if the magician wants to induce the (wrong) impression that a half-
ball is an ordinary, solid ball, he might casually let it bounce on the table. This method of 
actively inducing inappropriate problem representations is advocated by Ash (2009) and was 
already used by Duncker (1945) and, of course, by magicians all over the world. 
Experimentally manipulating these constraints opens interesting possibilities for future 
research. 
In the present context, priming studies seem to be well suited for this purpose, as 
already suggested by Öllinger (2005). For example, if the main constraint that prevents a 
solution of the trick consists of the fact that a ball is usually perceived as a whole (but is in 
fact a half-ball), the constraint could be relaxed by priming the concept of a half-sphere before 
presenting the magic trick. In this case, higher solving rates would be expected (and no 
restructuring would occur, compare 1.3). On the other hand, this constraint could be enforced 
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by priming the concept of a solid, complete ball (like the globe) which might prevent people 
from considering the possibility of dividing it in half. Here, we predict lower solving rates. A 
confirmation of these hypotheses would provide clear evidence for the mechanism of 
constraint relaxation as one way of restructuring an initially over-constrained problem 
representation, as postulated by Knoblich et al. (1999).  
We have claimed that new, more authentic tasks are needed for insight research. We 
argue that magic tricks are “ecologically valid” stimuli in the sense that efforts to understand 
the tricks are naturally set in motion. During the testing, we observed that participants were 
highly motivated to solve the presented tricks, even after many trials. Magic tricks are less 
artificially construed than the classical insight problems in which participants have to solve 
verbal riddles, logical brainteasers, mathematical problems or connect dots according to 
arbitrary rules. They are authentic because they take place in familiar situations with ordinary 
objects like coins or cigarettes. The present work indicates that such authentic stimuli can be 
as valuable as strictly controlled paper-and-pencil tasks. A systematic comparison of magic 
tricks with traditional types of stimuli (e.g. with regard to motivational aspects) would be 
needed to further substantiate this claim. Preliminary studies comparing magic tricks to three 
classical insight problems have already been conducted (not presented here). 
 Inducing positive mood could be another important advantage of using magic tricks in 
insight research. It has been shown previously that positive affect facilitates insight (e.g. 
Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Subramaniam et al., 2009; 
Sakaki & Niki, 2011). Isen and colleagues (1987) induced positive mood by presenting a 
comedy film (Gag reel) to participants shortly before they began working on Duncker’s 
Candle Problem (1935). A control group who had watched a neutral film (a math film, Area 
under a curve) produced significantly less solutions than the positive mood group. In an fMRI 
study, Subramaniam et al. (2009) found that participants who were high in positive mood 
solved a greater number of CRA problems with insight than participants who were lower in 
positive mood. These effects seemed to be related to increased brain activity in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), see also Kounios et al. (2006). It seems plausible that in the present 
study, participants’ emotional state was positively influenced by watching the magic tricks, 
similar to watching a comedy film. Verbal reports of participants’ individual solution 
experiences showed the high emotional impact of solving a magic trick. Although we did not 
directly assess mood since no mood markers were collected prior to testing, it was obvious 
that participants liked to watch the tricks and were highly motivated to do the task. Perhaps 
the drop-out rate of zero can also be accounted to that. Participants in the pilot studies scored 
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very high on the question “How much did you like the trick?” with a mean of 2.94 (on a 
rating scale from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much). We speculate that the positive mood 
induced by watching magic tricks also facilitated insight in the present study. In future 
experiments using magic tricks, we recommend to systematically control for mood.  
As Bowden et al. (2005) have pointed out, one recurrent difficulty in insight research 
is the use of very small sets of problems. Often, only one individual problem is presented to 
the problem solver (e.g. the nine-dot problem, Maier, 1930; Scheerer, 1963; see for example 
Chein et al., 2010). This poses methodological problems, especially in neuroscientific studies 
that require many repetitions to attain a reasonable signal-to-noise ratio. There are a few 
accounts that try to deal with this problem by using larger series of problems, for example, 
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) with a large set of CRA problems (see above). However, it is 
questionable if, while solving 186 of these verbal problems, participants’ subjective insight 
experience remains the same during the length of the entire experiment. The 80th Aha! 
experience probably feels different from the 1st Aha! experience, and might not be a very 
strong sensation anymore. Of course, the same argument could also be applied to our stimulus 
set of 34 magic tricks (presented in randomized order). We therefore conducted an additional 
analysis of our data set by distributing trials into three groups (the first 11 trials, the middle 12 
trials and the last 11 trials) and then comparing the number of Aha! experiences across these 
groups. The frequency of Aha! experiences did not differ between the three groups. 
Furthermore, we claim that magic tricks are better suited to trigger strong insight experiences 
than the verbal problems used by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004), because the emotional 
involvement is much higher, as just discussed. We claim that finding the solution to a magic 
trick results in a very intense experience, even after many repetitions, and this makes them 
potentially very valuable for studies requiring a large number of trials. On the other hand, the 
heterogeneity of magic tricks (and thus of the different trials) constitutes a major drawback 
that will be discussed together with other disadvantages now. 
The implementation of magic tricks as a problem solving task requires some 
methodological considerations. First, a magic trick is a dynamic, complex visual stimulus, and 
hard to be controlled. Creating homogenous stimuli is nearly impossible in that domain, 
because the movements differ from trick to trick, even if the objects stay the same (e.g. a 
coin). Depending on the question asked, this heterogeneity renders magic tricks useless for 
some researchers. Second, extensive pre-testing is necessary. We conducted three behavioural 
pilot studies on a sample of 45 students to identify appropriate tricks, to improve them, to 
ensure that they were understandable and that they could actually be solved. Third, the 
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stimulus development is very time-consuming. The tricks must be pre-selected according to 
the question of interest; the magic equipment and an appropriate setting to record the tricks 
must be provided. In the present work, after the first pilot study, a second recording session 
was necessary in order to improve the stimuli. Fourth, close collaboration with a professional 
magician is required because of the high demands during recording. The magician must be 
able to perform the tricks flawlessly, while at the same time, he cannot rely on direct 
interaction with an audience. Also, we decided to record the tricks in silence, another 
challenge for a magician who might normally use verbal cues to further distract the spectator 
or to elicit inappropriate assumptions.  
In summary, there is a trade-off between producing a very rich, motivating stimulus 
that triggers strong insight experiences and the difficulties to control it. We claim that it is 
worthwhile to undertake the effort and hope to have demonstrated the great potential of using 
magic tricks as a problem solving task. 
 
  
6.2 The Phenomenology of Aha! Experiences 
In the insight problem solving literature, participants’ subjective solving experience is 
often subsumed under the term “Aha! experience”. Likewise, we have specified the Aha! as 
the phenomenological experience that accompanies insightful solutions (compare introduction 
1.1.2). Although many studies, in particular those with a neuroscientific approach (e.g. Mai, 
Luo, Wu, & Luo, 2004; Luo, Niki, & Phillips, 2004), rely on this subjective experience as a 
trial sorting criterion, comparing insight vs. noninsight trials, the concept remains vague. In a 
first attempt to systematically assess separate aspects of the Aha! experience, we collected 
comprehensive quantitative and qualitative evaluations of participants’ insight experiences. 
The quantitative assessment remained stable across 14 days showing the high reliability of 
this subjective experience. With respect to individual dimensions, participants rated happiness 
as the most important dimension. Qualitatively, participants reported mainly emotional 
aspects, too. A primacy of positive emotions was thus found in both types of ratings, although 
two different methods were used (free self-reports and ratings on a visual analogue scale with 
fixed dimensions). The present work therefore provides evidence for the occurrence of strong 
positive emotions during sudden moments of insight which seem to constitute the prevailing 
aspect of the Aha! experience. 
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This result is in accordance with recent modelling work on the Aha! experience  
(Thagard & Stewart, 2011). In the so-called EMOCON model, Thagard and Stewart assume 
that the Aha! experience, triggered by the new combination of mental representations (i.e. 
restructuring in our terms), is a pattern of neural activity that arises through convolution. 
Convolution, the key explanatory mechanism of their model, can be understood as “[…] a 
mathematical operation that interweaves structures” (Thagard & Stewart, 2011, p. 1), for 
further details Thagard’s paper should be consulted. On the level of neural activity patterns, 
the Aha! experience is conceptualized as the convolution of an emotional response with a new 
combination of mental representations. The positive emotional reaction (“the ecstasy of 
discovery”, Thagard & Stewart, 2011, p. 10) that was found to be the prevailing aspect of the 
Aha! experience in the present work, is proposed to arise from automatic appraisal 
mechanisms that judge each new combination of mental representations with regard to its 
relevance (Thagard & Stewart, 2011). If the new combination is non-trivial, surprising and 
highly relevant for the problem solver, a strong emotional response is triggered. This certainly 
applies to the solutions of the magic tricks that have to be found out by our participants. 
Currently, this neurocomputational account simulates only simple visual patterns, but it must 
be credited for providing one possible explanation for the mysterious Aha! experience on a 
neural level.  
From a methodological point of view, the present investigation shows that direct 
qualitative self-reports can be helpful to learn more about the phenomenological aspects of 
insight. We argue that despite the obvious limitations of this introspective method (detailed, 
for example, by Schooler, 2011), subjective Aha! reports might provide information that 
would not be accessible through more rigorous experimental methods. Other researchers have 
successfully used verbal protocols to elucidate the processes during insight problem solving 
(Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Dominowski & Buyer, 2000). In fact, Fox 
(Fox et al., 2011) strongly advocates the use of verbal protocols to elucidate thinking 
processes, concluding from a carefully conducted meta-analysis on 94 studies that if certain 
standardized reporting methods are implemented, these measures are non-reactive, i.e. do not 
alter performance in any way (as was reported by Schooler et al., 1993). Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) provide detailed recommendations for these standardized methods. To conclude, we 
suggest that the traditional approach of using pre-defined “insight problems” and assuming 
the occurrence of insight in the case of a solved problem, without taking into account 
participants’ individual problem solving experiences, should always be complemented by 
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subjective measures such as Aha! self-reports, detailed Aha! evaluations or thinking-out-loud 
protocols.   
 
 
6.3 The Consequences of Insight: Facilitated Recall of             
Insight Solutions 
As a third research question, we investigated the impact of insight on memory 
performance. Specifically, we hypothesized that gaining sudden insight into the solution of a 
difficult problem would facilitate the recall of these solutions relative to noninsight solutions. 
The data obtained confirmed our hypothesis. 64.4% of all insight solutions were recalled 
correctly, whereas only 52.4% of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly.  
This recall advantage could result from the high emotional involvement during an 
Aha! experience that might facilitate the retention of insight solutions in memory (as 
suggested by Seifert et al., 1995) in contrast to noninsight solutions for which the emotional 
response is lacking. Following the somatic marker hypothesis with its claim that a somatic 
state can become linked to a memory content (Damasio, 1996), a possible mechanism could 
work like this: The emotional state experienced during the insight moment (recognized and 
classified by participants as “Aha! experience”) becomes linked to a cognitive state, namely 
the information about the solution of the problem. It is now generally acknowledged that 
emotional events are remembered with greater accuracy and vividness than neutral events 
(Reisberg & Hertel, 2004). The most prominent example are flashbulb memories (Brown & 
Kulik, 1977). However, the functional mechanisms of this memory enhancement are widely 
debated and still not clarified (Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Van Giezen, Arensman, Spinhoven, & 
Wolters, 2005). At present, the impact of positive emotions (thought to be involved in Aha! 
experiences, Gick & Lockhart, 1995) is less well documented than that of negative emotions, 
for which there is plenty of evidence for a memory enhancement effect. A recent example is 
provided by Pezdek (2003) who questioned US college students about their memory of the 
events on September 11th (World Trade Center attacks) and found more accurate event 
memory in the New York sample (shown to be more distressed by this event) than control 
samples from Hawaii and California. However, other studies have shown detrimental effects 
of strong emotions on recall performance (e.g. Adolphs, Denburg, & Tranel, 2001), at least on 
the memory for details. In sum, the effects of emotion on recall performance are not 
completely understood yet.  
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However, from an anatomical perspective, the possible link between strong emotional 
reactions and memory for insightful solutions would also be meaningful. It has been 
suggested (Öllinger, 2005) that during insight problem solving, there is an intense interplay 
between the hippocampus and the amygdala. The amygdala is known as a crucial region for 
processing of emotionally relevant stimuli (e.g. R. J. Davidson & Irwin, 1999) whereas the 
hippocampus subserves memory consolidation (e.g. Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). In an 
fMRI stuy, Luo et al. (Luo & Niki, 2003) detected hippocampus activity during insight 
problem solving of Japanese riddles. In the framework of the representational change theory 
(Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999), this proposal can be further elaborated: It was claimed 
recently that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) might play an important role in 
determining the goal representation of a given problem (Frith, 2000). The basic idea is that 
the DLPFC biases the response space by activating a set of potential solution strategies which 
initially seem to be appropriate to solve the problem at hand (Frith, 2000). However, because 
these solution strategies are based on wrong assumptions (i.e. constraints), the initial 
representation is incorrect and no solution can be found (Ohlsson, 1992) unless the constraints 
are relaxed. There is evidence for this proposal from a study on brain-lesioned patients 
(Reverberi, Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap, 2005) where it was impressively demonstrated that 
patients with lesions to the lateral frontal lobe were more successful than healthy controls in 
solving very difficult insight problems (matchstick arithmetic tasks) that required many 
constraints to be relaxed. This was explained by the representational change theory (Ohlsson, 
1992; Knoblich et al., 1999) as well as by Frith’s account (2000). Therefore, the DLPFC 
might be the brain site where constraints are activated by prior knowledge. Just like other 
insight problems, magic tricks require the observer to overcome theses constraints that are 
induced by the magician, as detailed in the introduction. We assume that there is a mismatch 
between the initially activated, biased problem representation and the observed magic effect, 
e.g. a flying table. In this example, one constraint would consist of initially representing the 
table as an ordinary, normal object – and flying is clearly not compatible with our prior 
knowledge about tables (including e.g. their weight). The crucial brain site for detection of 
such cognitive conflict might be the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), as shown by Mai et al. 
in an ERP study on Chinese riddles (Mai et al., 2004) and also by Luo et al. (Luo et al., 2004) 
in an imaging study. There is further evidence for an implication of the ACC in insight 
processes (Starchenko, Bekhtereva, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2003; Kounios et al., 2006; 
Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009). It is conceivable that the detected mismatch triggers the emotional 
arousal that is mediated by the amygdalae and that facilitates the encoding of such a newly 
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gained insight into the memory system. However, since the neural basis of insightful 
experiences still remains unclear (see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, for a very thorough review), 
further research is warranted to confirm these speculative explanations. 
The finding of a memory advantage for insightful solutions is related to the early 
works of the Gestalt theory of thinking, in which a positive relationship between restructuring 
and learning was discussed. Normatively, “good” productive thinking was set apart from 
“bad” reproductive thinking. In a way, these ideas are very modern, disapproving of the blind 
“drill” (Wertheimer, 1959, p. 234) that was (and sometimes still is) used as the standard 
teaching method in schools. Max Wertheimer visited classes and observed teaching, for 
example, during lessons of geometry, and in his last book from 1959, there is an appendix 
“Suggestions for teaching about area”. 
In the present work, we have demonstrated a facilitating effect of previous insight 
experiences on the recall of solutions after a delay of 14 days. This finding is in accordance 
with the theoretical assumption of representational change and the resulting transfer of 
knowledge about a solution. Based on the somatic marker hypothesis, we offer a first 
explanation of this memory advantage by the well-known effects of strong emotional 
reactions on recall performance. A replication of these results, also with stimuli from classical 
insight task domains, must be awaited and future studies addressing the neural basis of this 
effect are needed to clarify the role of the insight experience in memory (see next section).  
 
 
6.4 Future Research 
In the course of the present work, several aspects emerged that seem to be valuable for 
future research. Specifically, three processes that have been identified as playing a crucial role 
in insight problem solving can ideally be addressed within the task domain of magic tricks: 
Attention, functional fixedness and mental set.  
For example, Grant and Spivey (2003) showed that visually guiding participants’ 
attention towards the critical feature of Duncker’s radiation problem (Duncker, 1945) 
significantly increased solution rates (compare also Knoblich et al., 2001). This corresponds 
to the magicians’ often-used method of misdirecting (e.g. Fraps, 2006; Kuhn, Tatler, & Cole, 
2009; Kuhn & Martinez, 2012) observers’ attention to irrelevant locations, e.g. guiding 
attention away from the secret action that is performed with the left hand by loudly clicking 
the fingers of the right hand. Similarly to the participants in Grant and Spivey’s study (2003), 
	   96 
observers trying to solve a magic trick that is based on misdirection must change their 
problem representation by re-directing their attention to the relevant locations. Of course, the 
magician will typically prevent this, for example by exploiting gaze following mechanisms, as 
was clearly demonstrated by Kuhn et al. (2009). However, for experimental purposes, for 
example to investigate the influence of attention on solving rates, two versions of the same 
trick could be developed, one with the typical misdirection and another one in which the 
magician guides participants’ attention to the relevant location. We would expect that the 
latter manipulation would yield higher solution rates.  
Another well-known concept that Duncker developed to explain the difficulty of one 
of his classical insight problems (the Candle Problem), is that of functional fixedness 
(Duncker, 1935), compare section 1.2.1. Functional fixedness is exploited by magicians when 
they present everyday objects like a glass of wine and therefore automatically activate 
observers’ implicit knowledge about these objects (e.g. that glasses break when dropping to 
the floor). In the case of a magic trick, this knowledge usually turns out to be wrong (the glass 
remains intact because it is a gimmick, and not a real glass) and that constitutes the surprising 
effect. Observers must overcome these implicit constraints in order to be able to solve the 
trick. The relative difficulty of a trick in which functional fixedness is exploited therefore 
provides information about the malleability of the specific constraints.  
There is a third process discussed in the insight literature that can be manipulated 
through magic trick stimuli: Mental set (Luchins, 1942). Magicians force their audience into a 
certain mental set by wrapping a story around their magic effect. For example, an observer is 
asked to put his freely selected card back into a deck of cards and shuffle them. Great 
emphasis is put on the fact that the card should be put deeply in the middle of the stack and 
that the cards must be very carefully shuffled, for a very long time etc. The mental set induced 
in this case would be that the cards are now in completely random order (of course, later on 
the magician will effortlessly find the card in question right on top of the stack or even behind 
the observer’s ear). Only if the observer achieves to overcome this mental set can the solution 
of the trick be found out. Magic trick paradigms could thus complement current studies on 
how mental set influences the probability of insight (e.g. Öllinger et al., 2008). 	  
Magic tricks offer another experimental possibility that might be of interest to problem 
solving researchers: We have described two cases in which no restructuring can occur 
(compare 1.3), the first case could be investigated through a priming study (see above). The 
second case could be implemented as follows: Ohlsson (1984b) suggests that if the correct 
encoding is not available to the problem solver, no restructuring can occur. This means, the 
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problem remains unsolvable. This case might not be very useful in adult participants. 
However, we propose that children represent an ideal sample population for investigating that 
situation. Children have a smaller knowledge base at their disposal and many concepts are not 
yet familiar to them. Researchers could profit greatly from the large amount of evidence from 
developmental psychology indicating critical periods of development of different concepts. 
The smaller knowledge base of children makes two different experimental manipulations 
possible, depending on whether the knowledge element is acting as a constraint or whether it 
is required for the solution. First, tricks would be used for which certain prior knowledge 
elements (e.g. knowledge about the solidity of glass objects) activate constraints in adults. 
Testing children that have not developed this concept yet, we would expect that they will be 
less hampered by self-imposed constraints resulting from prior knowledge and thus, for them 
the problem might be easier to solve than for adults. Second, tricks would be used which 
require the same knowledge elements for a solution. In this case, we predict that children 
should not be able to solve the problem at all, because they are lacking this concept.  
As already discussed in the introduction (1.5.1), we adopted Bowden et al.’s (2005) 
approach to determine the occurrence of insight through participants’ trial-wise insight 
ratings. Thus, we relied on the assumption that the subjective Aha! experience is a marker for 
insight. This is plausible, but has not been tested empirically so far. In fact, it is very difficult 
to think up a method to test this question because independent behavioural markers of 
restructuring (apart from the insight rating) would be needed. The problem could be solved if 
we succeeded in identifying distinct neural activity patterns resulting from restructuring. First 
promising steps towards this goal have already been made. In 2004, Jung-Beeman et al. 
conducted one of the first studies aiming at neural correlates of restructuring (see 5.1 for a 
short overview). Contrasting insight with noninsight events based on categorizations by 
participants, they found that insight solutions were associated with a burst of high-frequency 
(in the gamma frequency band, 40Hz) activity over right anterior temporal electrodes. In the 
corresponding fMRI activity patterns, the same region seemed to be involved. These findings 
are very valuable, but since they are again based on the insight rating approach, they cannot 
contribute to verifying or refuting the assumption that subjective insight ratings are actually a 
marker for restructuring. However, the basis for the next step is provided: If this finding is 
replicated, especially with tasks from other, non-verbal domains, the gamma burst might be 
used as a possible indicator to infer the occurrence of insight. Therefore, further research on 
the neural correlates of restructuring is warranted. The present thesis reported a first attempt 
to implement magic tricks in an EEG study design. However, the procedure used did not yield 
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meaningful data. One limiting factor was the low number of trials, another the high variability 
in reaction times across participants. It is also questionable whether EEG is the appropriate 
method for dynamic video stimuli. In contrast, neuroimaging techniques have already been 
successfully used with video stimuli of magic tricks, although for a completely different 
research question (Parris et al., 2009). We suggest that magic tricks represent an alternative, 
non-verbal task to the CRA problems used by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004), since they also 
allow for a comparison of both solving modes (restructuring and analytical problem solving) 
while keeping the problem type constant. As Kounios and Jung-Beeman (2009) point out, it 
remains unclear whether their reported results are specific to verbal problems. Therefore, our 
new paradigm constitutes a valuable contribution to the field of insight research. Combining 
the novel task domain of magic tricks with established tasks such as CRA problems also in 
neuroscientific studies, could help to further elucidate the process of insight problem solving 
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8 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: List of Magic Stimuli 
 
  Trick Name Magic Effect Trick Description Solved1 With2 
Aha! 
Surprise3 
1 Knives Transposition  Two differently coloured knives change places 14,58 28,57 2,55 
2 Orange Transformation  An orange is transformed into an apple 16,67 50,00 3,57 
3 Monte Transposition  A card swaps places with another one 22,92 27,27 2,82 
4 Rope Restoration  A rope is cut in two pieces and restored to one 25,00 50,00 2,50 
5 Coin Trick 1 Vanish  Out of three coins, one vanishes 27,08 23,08 2,91 
6 Billiard Balls Appearance  A little red ball multiplies 29,17 35,71 2,71 
7 Coin Trick 2 Appearance 
and Vanish 
 A coin is held up in the air, vanishes and 
reappears 
31,25 40,00 2,61 
8 Card Trick 1 Telekinesis  Cards turn over by themselves 31,25 33,33 2,54 
9 Rubik's Cube Transformation  Rubik's cube is solved by throwing it up in the air 33,33 50,00 3,17 
10 Salt Vanish  Salt is poured in the fist from where it disappears 33,33 43,75 3,04 
11 KetchupBottle Vanish  A ketchup bottle is put in a bag and disappears  35,42 29,41 3,27 
12 Coin Trick 3 Transposition  A coin wanders from the hand under a napkin 37,50 44,44 2,58 
13 Bottled Scarf Vanish  A red scarf disappears from a closed bottle 39,58 36,84 3,00 
14 Pen Penetration  Paper is pierced by a pen, but remains intact 43,75 42,86 2,75 
15 Money Transformation  Sheets of white paper turn into 50 Euro bills  43,75 28,57 3,00 
16 Matchsticks Penetration  One matchstick wanders through another one 45,83 50,00 2,59 
17 Glass Vanish  A champagne glass is covered by cloth and 
disappears 
47,92 39,13 2,26 
18 Red Scarf Appearance  A large red scarf appears from nowhere 47,92 60,87 2,73 
19 Card Trick 2 Restoration  A card is ripped in pieces and restored 50,00 33,33 3,22 
20 Ice Cube Transformation  Water is transformed into an ice cube 50,00 25,00 3,14 
21 Coin Trick 4 Penetration  A coin penetrates a sealed glass 52,08 20,00 3,00 
22 Ball Transformation  A ball gets transformed into a cube 52,08 36,00 2,50 
23 Card Trick 3 Penetration  Cards are chained to each other and unchained 
without damage 
54,17 30,77 3,25 
24 Flying ball Telekinesis 
(Levitation) 
 A ball is floating between the magician’s hands 54,17 42,31 3,00 
25 Card Trick 4 Transformation  Cards in a glass change their colours 58,33 42,86 2,50 
26 Coin Trick 5 Transposition  3 coins wander from one hand into the other 62,50 40,00 2,67 
27 Salt 'n 
Pepper 
Vanish  Salt and pepper are poured into one hand and   
the pepper disappears 
64,58 32,26 3,13 
28 Flying Bun Telekinesis 
(Levitation) 
 A bun is covered by a napkin and starts to fly 66,67 37,50 2,50 
29 Bouncing Egg Physical 
impossibility 
 A real egg is bounced repeatedly on the floor 
without breaking 
72,92 25,71 3,05 
30 Scarf to Egg Transformation  A scarf turns into an egg 77,08 70,27 2,67 
31 Bowling Ball Topological 
impossibility 
(size) 
 A large bowling ball is carried in a thin suitcase 81,25 28,21 2,83 
32 Coat Hanger Topological 
impossibility 
(size) 
 A coat hanger is pulled from a small purse 83,33 50,00 2,88 
33 Cigarette Vanish  Cigarette and lighter disappear while the 
magician tries to light his cigarette 
85,42 53,66 3,17 
34 Spoon Transformation  A spoon is put into the magician's mouth and 
when removed, it has changed into a fork 
95,83 65,22 2,88 
Tricks are sorted according to their difficulty (starting from the least solved ones).  
1 Percentage of participants who solved the trick (after repeated viewing) 
2 Percentage of participants who indicated an Aha! experience (of those participants who had solved it) 
3 In a pilot study, 50 participants rated their level of surprise caused by the magic effect from 1 (not at all surprised) to 4 
(very much surprised). The mean rating for each trick is indicated.  
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Appendix B: Free Self-Reports by Participants 
 
 
1. A moment of bliss. I am happy and get into a good mood. An increasing certainty. Everything becomes 
perfectly clear, a tingling in my head.  
 
2. I’m excited and I feel no doubt about this sudden solution. 
 
3. A sudden discovery, unexpected, a feeling of "that's how the solution must be", no hesitation. 
 
4. A feeling of definite knowledge or alternatively, a first sensation of knowledge that is not necessarily 
confirmed in the next step, but initially, feels certain and irrefutable. A sense of triumph because one has seen 
through the trick. "Gotcha!"-feeling. Yes, of course, there is no other way! As long as any doubts about the 
correctness remain, it is no Aha! effect. 
 
5. I perceive a certain movement of the hand, from which I can infer how the trick could possibly work. Thus, it 
can only be detected at a certain time point of the trick. Classic Aha! experience, a feeling of seeing through the 
trick all at once. 
 
6. For me, I experienced an Aha! either when I could see the solution in my mind or when I had the feeling of 
knowing the solution. This feeling is similar to being motivated to do something, knowing that it is exactly the 
right thing. With Aha! experiences, I am much more motivated to continue working on the task or problem. 
 
7. I did not experience any Aha! 
 
8. Sometimes it was a very strong feeling, as if I had solved an extremely difficult case that mattered greatly. 
Other times, it was more like "ok, now I got you and I know how you did it". In the first case, the excitement 
was much greater, in the second case, it was more relieving. 
 
9. It can perhaps be described as a flash, suddenly I knew the answer, even if shortly before, I didn't have a clue. 
It's a wonderful, positive feeling and for me, it felt a bit like relief.  
 
10. It's like a small tension that gets released suddenly and a positive and liberating feeling emerges. 
 
11. Suddenly, without prior warning, the only plausible solution pops out in my mind. Feeling of joy. 
 
12. In a split second, I'm struck by a flash of genius. 
 
13. When suddenly the brain knows how it happened.  
 
14. Very good. I believe that the magician can't fool me anymore because by now, I could do the trick by myself. 
With an Aha! experience, I feel very sure about the solution. 
 
15. Suddenly, everything becomes perfectly clear, the missing link is found. It is awesome to suddenly see 
through the trick, because I feel very clever. It just clicks and it is a very positive feeling. Like a reward for 
thinking so hard. I feel lively and happy to have figured it out. A feeling of bliss. 
 
16. When the different parts fall into place and my considerations make sense. A slight pull in the chest. 
 
17. It‘s like a shot through my body. Being awakened from previous ignorance, I feel really happy. 
 
18. Explosively, the bad feeling of frustration and confusion turns into a feeling of happiness and I feel a swell of 
pride. 
 
19. I detected a small detail and suddenly, the things that I had observed previously make sense. It feels like the 
penny has dropped, and I feel a bit proud to be so certain now, although I had no clue just a few seconds before. 
 
20. I feel that suddenly, I know the solution, thrilled, excited, pleased to have understood something. 
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21. It seems as if in this moment, all confusion in my brain becomes resolved and I should have known it earlier, 
simply because it is so logical. The Aha! experience can really be described as the feeling of switching on a light 
bulb. And I feel somehow affirmated and positively relaxed. 
 
22. I had no Aha! experiences. 
 
23. Abruptly, it becomes clear what's hidden behind all this. When I search for a solution, and suddenly the 
tension gets released, because I figured it out. A release of tension occurs in my head. 
 
24. „It dawned on me“ is a saying which can very well be connected with this effect; you have thought about a 
certain matter for a while and suddenly, there is a detail you had not noted earlier which now is leading you in a 
different direction. It’s also a moment of relief and relaxation – time seems to have come to a standstill for a 
short while. Maybe it’s some sort of very short flow experience. 
  
25. In contrast to the other moments I didn’t have to check the realisation; the solution seemed to be 
unambiguous, mostly like remembering something. Usually I’m quite certain about it. 
  
26. Suddenly one knows or believes to know how it works without checking it in detail. 
 
27. The moment comes quite suddenly, as if the idea jumps directly into your mind and doesn’t develop step by 
step by reflection. I am happy about the surprising knowledge. 
 
28. A sudden image appears before my inner eye, triggering off an impulse for action. The further course of the 
magic trick becomes uninteresting, the focus is on the image which seems to be the solution or actually is the 
solution. 
 
29. You can’t understand why you didn’t see that before although it is so simple. It didn’t come about by logical 
reflections but rather simply because it has to be as it is. 
 
30. Like a sudden relief after a time of tension, a feeling of happiness. What in the beginning didn’t fit together 
suddenly makes sense. Thoughts can keep flowing where before they were in front of a barrier. 
 
31. The sudden understanding of the solution. The solution becomes visible before my inner eye in a flash. 
 
32. During an Aha! experience you suddenly realize a detail; somehow you are happy to have seen through the 
magic trick. 
  
33. Satisfaction at having found the correct solution. 
 
34. With an Aha! experience I suddenly feel an enlightenment; it is as if quite suddenly the light was switched 
on or a switch turned. 
 
35. Very quick feeling, easy and liberating. 
 
36. I think the magician always did something to distract me from his tricks. So, after the second viewing, I 
concentrated on what had changed or had disappeared. As soon as I did so, I had this Aha! experience and I was 
happy. 
 
37. Very happy and surprising. 
 
38. An Aha! experience feels good. Here, once in a while, suspicious hand movements of the magician were 
interpreted as important for a sudden understanding of the trick; other Aha! experiences felt like a sudden 
memory of a similiar trick. Aha! experiences felt like ideas, similar to agreeable memories suddenly having 
come back. 
 
39. Beautiful, surprised by oneself. 
 
40. Can’t remember exactly, but it feels a bit like a sudden intuition and like „Oh, that’s it! Why didn’t I find out 
earlier?“. 
 
41. The Aha! experience is marked by a feeling of joy and personal satisfaction triggered off by finding the 
solution. 
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42. Through a detail, e.g. the cut-off upper part of the spoon, the entire action sequence becomes clear, 
respectively foreseeable and further details can be detected, e.g. that the magician once again puts the spoon in 
his hand and quickly takes it out again. 
 
43. Rather nice…you observe what you can see and try to explain how it works and then a decisive detail strikes 
you – suddenly you have an idea how it could work. As if you had found the last missing part of the puzzle in 
order to reconstruct the rest of the picture. 
 
44.  It feels like an enlightenment, a sudden inspiration how the problem can be solved. Suddenly all pieces of 
information fit together which before had not fitted together. 
 
45. It feels good because suddenly I know something. It feels alright and, in a way, makes me happy. 
 
46. Aha! experiences could be compared to a quick jump in my head. I didn’t have to think rationally about how 
the trick worked, but it simply came to me. 
 
47. I feel as if a light had been switched on in my head and I’m thinking of my Latin teacher who kept speaking 
about this. We had lots of Aha! experiences with him. 
 












6. Aha! experience – a short inspiration how to get out of this hopeless situation. This feeling gives me wings 
that make me continue working on the problem which I had not been able to solve before. And, naturally, I 
immediately feel inclined to solve further problems, as it seems you now can do anything, no matter which task 
you have been set.  
 
7. No Aha! experiences.  
 
8. I had two different kinds of Aha! experiences. With one, I felt like suddenly having an idea how the trick had 
been done – sort of thunder-struck! With the other Aha! experience, I felt as if I had reflected for a moment, I 
was rather relieved to have seen through the trick, whereas with the first kind I felt as if I had tricked the 
magician himself by understanding his trick. 
 
9. I found the solution rather fast, I didn’t have to think about it at all and I had no clues from which to start 
thinking. There was a feeling of relief connected with the Aha! experience, it was a very positive feeling. 
 
10. Some sort of tension is released, it is a relaxing, positive sensation and it also gives you some kind of feeling 
of success. 
 
11. I was excited, felt good and satisfied, it felt as if the solution had suddenly appeared in my head. 
 
12. The Aha! experience came suddenly and unexpectedly. 
 
13. It suddenly appears in my head how the trick works and it somehow feels great to find this out, well, the 
feelings are: gladness, joy to have found out and curiosity, as you can’t always be sure if it really works like that. 
 
14. Very good, I think I know exactly what has just happened. I have exactly understood the trick or the 
situation, I am quite sure to be right. 
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15. It simply goes snap und you’ve got it! Before it happens you keep thinking about it and don’t quite get round 
it, but when the Aha! experience occurs, then you suddenly understand everything – it’s like an insight into the 
whole situation. 
 
16. Like a slight pull in my chest and tummy. 
 
17. Excitement and a feeling like a warm swirl going through my body. I feel relieved and relaxed, joyful. 
 
18. A sudden change from a feeling of insecurity and fear of failure to a feeling of joy and pride. Especially in 
this moment of change, I’m experiencing an incredible energy 
flowing through my body. 
 
19. I am glad and proud to have found a solution, relieved, for a short while I forget what is happening around 
me. 
 
20. I feel surprised that I have understood something, I am content, maybe even proud of myself, I feel pretty 
good and agreeable. It certainly is a positive feeling, making me more enthusiastic and full of energy. 
 
21. An Aha! experience feels good, as if I actually saw a light switched on, suddenly everything appears to be 
quite clear. 
 
22. I had none. 
 
23. Like a flash of genius, as if suddenly everything became clear, you keep brooding and then it suddenly 
appears, tension disappears, you feel released, a bit euphoric. 
 
24. As if a light was switched on, something that before I hadn’t properly paid attention to now turned out to be 
the cause of a whole series of effects. 
 
25. Sudden remembrance, dissatisfaction about not having discovered it earlier. 
 
26. Suddenly I know the answer, it is as if a light lightened up the darkness. 
 
27. It is as if the idea appeared suddenly out of nowhere and came into my mind. I’m glad about the surprising 
knowledge and I’m very content. 
 
28. Suddenly an image appears in my mind’s eye, everything else around me becomes uninteresting and the 
concentration is focused only on that image which could be, respectively is, the solution of a problem. 
 
29. Strange that I haven’t seen the solution earlier, it turned out to be much easier than I would have expected. At 
some point, the understanding is simply there. 
 
30. It was a feeling of relief combined with a feeling of happiness after a phase of strain caused by failure. 
 
31. A sudden moment, a feeling of understanding as if it began to dawn on me. 
 
32. It felt good to have found the solution. It was like a competition between me and the magician, and in an 
Aha! moments, I felt like the winner. 
 
33. When I discovered the solution, I sudddenly was content about myself. 
 
34. It is like a sudden flash of insight, as if someone had switched on a lamp bringing light into the darkness. 
This moment comes as a surprise and without warning. 
 
35. A slight feeling as is something fell off. For a short moment, you get a feeling of a clear sight. 
 
36. With some tricks, the understanding came suddenly, very easy and I felt glad. 
 
37. Surprising and funny. 
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38. You have an Aha! experience when understanding connections, thus creating a meaningful image. It can be 
compared to the good feeling of having finished something that had cost you a lot of time and effort, a positive 
feeling of understanding. 
 
39. Beautiful. Surprised. Fulfillment of my ambitions. Cool. 
 
40. A moment when you think: Yes, that’s it! Why didn’t I see that before! 
 
41. An Aha! experience is very satisfying, you think you have finally understood how it works and that you have 
unmasked the trick. Also in other situations, Aha! experiences feel like that. Immediately, you are completely 
sure about it. 
 
42. Suddenly the solution appears quickly in my mind. In most cases, it is quite a different track than I had 
expected before. All the other steps simply follow. 
 
43. I have a smaller or greater experience of success when I believe to have understood the trick. 
 
44. A problem is suddenly understood and solved, it’s like a stroke of genius and sometimes you don’t even 
know how you found the solution. 
 
45. A feeling of great satisfaction, a redeeming, relaxing moment, making me feel happy and satisfied. 
 
46. A moment that liberates your mind, relieving your mind from strain, you feel enlightened. 
 
47. I was ever so pleased about having seen through the trick, respectively a little less pleased. 
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